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SANDVKEN DISTRICT COURT

MINUTES OF PSEXiyiKAKY
HEARING
in Saadviten on
2nd November 1992
T 31/91
Amrrr 30

THECOUBT
Deputy District Judge Joban Alvccr
KEEPER OF THE MINUTES
Law Cteic Marianne Lfcjdhalm
PETITIONER
Kudu SOFIA Larson, nat rcg. so. 671029-7505, Gnindbogatan 1 E,
S-811 30 SANDVTKEN; present in person
Legal reprtiCTtativc: Anita Wallin-Wlberg, Attnrncy-at-law, Bo* 1333,
S-S01 38 SANDVKEN: present
RESPONDENT
MARK Andrew Larson, b. 6.11-65, cf 69 E 600 N Provo, Utah 84606. USA;
present in person
Legal representative: Bengt Heasei, Attaraey-aUaw, Box 244, S-811 23
SANDVKEN; present
CAUSE
Dissolution of marriage etru
Bengt Hennel submitted Mark Larson's application far legal aid. Annrx 31, and
stated as fellows. Mark wasrinmirilrriin Sweden for tbout one year at the age
of six or seven axxi then between 1985 and 1987. He cannot afford to retain
counsel in Sweden out of his own podoet and there are special grounds for
awarding him legal aid.
Anita Wallia Wiherg, rr^rrtfrg Sofia Lsrson's points of claim, stated u follows*
Sofia Larson prays the District Court to make a decree absolute of divorce
between the patties by pazt^odgement and, also on an inrrrincnggy basis* to
award her sole custody of their daughter Julia and m order Mark Larson to pay
her, as t"*i"Trn*t>rr- for the daughter, SVK i«075 monthly for the period between
1st January and 31st May 1991 and SEBL 1.125 monthly ftom 15th January 1992
and until the child is 18 years old.

a
mnintsnnncc claims. For hia own part, alia on i n inteiocqtory basis, Mark
Laraon xa thf first inntancc claimi custody of the daughter. M i l , and pxayi chat
Sofia Larson be ordered to pay him. as maintenance far meir daughter, SEK
1,073 monthly from tha day QT xte District Court's temporary order in the matter
nnril the daughter Is 18 yean old, and to tlu: second lensnexs, in the event of
Sofia being awarded cu*u*iy of Julia, access to disk daughter in d» USA for two
coorinucua months ansuatty for the period between 1993 and 1997 asd six wooks
ffTtfin^ny thenxaftnr. Mark Tarinn confirms Julia's need of miTntpnince at tha
standard rate of SEK 1,075 mnortily and his own ability tn pay maintenance. In
the event of custody of (he dangif"* ben* awarded to Sofia Larson. Mark has
discharged his maintenance obllaadon for die period preceding 15th January 1992.
Anita Wallin Wibcrg ststed u follows. Sofia Larson contact* tha custody and
ULtinanacce claims. Julia's need of m**™****™-- ts confirmed, bat So fix Larson
does cat have the economic resources tn pay maintenance. As regard* the custody
claim, Sofu Larson consents to Mark Larson bdn* flren the opportunity of
access to the child, but not tu die a u n t claimed snd uut in the USA.
Anita WaHin Wiberg atirrri further as foitawi. Sofu Larson met Mark Lanon,
who ia a member of the Chwch of Jesus Chriat of Later-Day Stints, in 1986,
while he was living in Sweden. Sofia visited Mark in the USA in 1989 and the
couple were manied in October 1989. They sealed in the USA and their dmrghmr
Julia was bom in August 1590. Alter cobbiadna Chrifflnni in &wtad*nt Sofk
^ ^ ^ H tn IT™**" t h m nnd in J«™**y 1991 pcticooed for t divorce. In July 1991
Sofia returned to Mark in the USA in a bid to save their marriage, but the
relationship was iirepaiabls. Sofia considers Mark tempemoental and uncac*
trolled. He hss a violent temper sod has hit and Wdced Sofia in Julia's presence.
Softs does not wish to leave Mart alone with JUlla and fears that Mark could
kidnap Julia and take her to the XJ5A. Mark's merest in Julk lea grown since
Sulk brought their daughter to Sweden. Between July 1991 and January 1992,
when Sofia and Julia were living with Mark in the USA, there was a let of
<junrrefling snd Sofia w u forced to leave the USA without telling Mark in
sdvince. Summing up, it is Sofia who, ever since Julia waa born, bai been
mainly responsible for her snd is ben suited to look sftrr her, Jotm custody ti not
feasible and It is in Julia's best uuercau for Sofia lo be awarded sole custody of
her.
Bengt Heunel stated u follows. Sofia Ldt the USA ia November 1990. It was
agreed that Mark ahould join her and that they ware to celebrate Oniinnai with
Sofia'* family in Sweden. Sofia's relatives persuaded her to stay on in Sweden.
and Made w u iioerally dixuwu nut by tier Xamily. Evidoody one of Scfia'a women
tricada had phoned, aaymg that Mack mrnnried to kidmp Julia, which was a
compiles fabrication. When Sofia and Julia returned to the USA in tha itimner
of 1WI. awything want well to besin with, hut in Nowmher 1991 Cbe
Kclaikiuahip deteriorated and Sofia returned to Sweden without telling Mark first.
i £ mrj<^o>x3ctwasi January and June 1991, Mark contributed towaria Julia's Upkeep by
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1Q%4QG net)* Mark used to have hia own flat, but he is now living with hi*
grandmother. Mack works in the optica industry and haa plenty of scope for
working overtime; this entitles him to time off, over and above the tegular two
weeks1 paid holiday. If Julia cornea to the USA, Mark can work half-time and
look after her during his leisure. A brother, with a Swedish wife, and three
married cousins live in the some city, and ao Mark has plenty of help available
for looking after Julia. While in Sweden, Maxk haa been allowed to me^t Julia far
about 10 hours, always in the presence of Sofia and her relatives. Sofia has no
grounds whatsoever for denying him normal access to their daughter, and with
Sofia's altitude to the matter of access, ft is Made who is best suited for custody
of Julia. Mark it aware that a child naeda both its parents and Sofia would be
given plenty of opportunity for regular access to Julia. If Sofia ia awarded custody
of their daughter and Mark irms, then, while Julia is still too small to travel on
her own, Mart will come to Sweden and collect Julia and will then bring her
back to Sweden.
Anita Wallin Wiberg stated as fallows. Sofia has not received any financial
assistance towards Julia's upkeep. On the other hand she has received money
towards her tnlrphnrm bill and towards the cost of forwarding luggage. As regards
the risk of kidnapping, Sofia's <-***«« of recovering her daughter if Mark ahould
keep her in the USA are fairly nan-exiatcaL Sofia ia currently unemployed. She
previously bad a temporary teaching job and ia now waiting to hear whether she
has been accepted for a study programme she haa applied for.
Bengt Hennei stated as fallows. Mark Larson confirms that Sofia Larson is
unemployed.
Sofia Larson sratcri as follows. While she was living in the USA, Mark had
outbursts of tzge and threw things, often without her being able to understand
why. Mark has struck hnr and occasionally aiso kicked her. They differed on
many matters, e.g. religion and child education. She returned to the USA brcauv
she wanted the relationship to work, but it would oat. Mark has never been
violent to Julia and now that they have met in Sweden things have gone well.
Sofia doea not know whether the threat of kidnapping was in earnest, but she does
not trust Made Mark ahould be allowed access to Julia but ahould cot be allowed
to take her to the USA anal Julia is older.
Maxk Larson stated as follows. He has always cared about Julia, but distance hai
made it hard to keep in touch with her. Previously Sofia also prevented him from
niiTing to Julia ca the phone. The relatincahip between himself and Sofia broke
down and Sofia was depressed, felt bad and would not speak co her friends or
even meet them. There wme two occasions when he "struck" Sofia. One of them
was a purely reflex movement against Sofia's leg, and the secondrimewas a blow
which struck her on the cheek when she 'exploded" in the car. Sofia can not have
been injured on either of tfi-r* occasions. He has never klrirad her and never
jwn anything it her or in such a way that there was a risk of her being struck.
la c
^ ^ ^ A Z T ^ S K ? ' 8 ^ °f kidnapping is quite groundless. On the contrary, he has told her

nn/i/i

la
thai he would never go off with Julia the way Sofia did when she took Julia and
left the USA without celling him fiisc Sofia and Julia have a good relationship
and he wants it to continue. If he is awarded cuitody, folk will be allowea to
visit Sofia in Sweden.
Anita Wallin Wibcrg stated a* follows. Sofia Larson consents to Mark Larson
hrrrg allowed access to Julia, three times a year for one week at a time. Access
may be exercised in Sofia'i home or in some other place on which the parties can
agree, but not in the USA.
Anita Wallin Wtberg cMrnrri remuneration in accordance with an expense
ifmum i Annex 31. suhmiucd.
The proceedings, having hated from 11 a.m. to 12.23 p.m., were declared closed
with the announcement (hat a part-judgement and order would be made by being
made available in the District Conn Office on 13th November 1992 at 2 p.m.
Retiring to chambers, the District Court made a part-judgement ana the fallowing
ORDER (to be issued on 13th November 1992 at 2 p.nx.).
Until such time as these matters have been detenninad by a judicial decision,
having force of law or by a decision to the contrary, the Districtr Court orders
u follows.
1.

Cnimriy of TTTLIA Snfi*. nar. reg. vn. 900HlKi92Sf dull cooitae to be
vcased in Sofia Larson . sa ordered by the District Court in its temporary

order ot 10& May 1991.
2<

The District Courtfindsno cause to amend its temporary order of lOthMay
1991 in die matter of TmHwngnra^ which order shall accordingly remain in
force.

3.

Mark Larson shall be ****** to accen to the daughter. Julia, for one
month in the year, at a time to be agreed on in detail between the parties.

Anita Wallin Wiberg is awarded an advance payment of SEX 9,850 under the
Legal Aid Act. In view at the rules coxEerning payment of legal aid charges, this
entire " r o w shall be disbursed out of public fundi.

0043
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My ippal against this order shall bfi m*k separately, by limited appeal, not
liter thin 4th December 1992.
Date u above,
(Signature:)
Marianne Liadhdm
Recent read and approved/(Initials)
(Stamp:)
SANDVKEN DISTRICT COURT
For a txua copy,
(Signature)

nr\Ao
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THE COURT OF APPEAL
FOR SOUTHERN NORRLAND

REODRD OP HEAHJNG
in Sundivsil on
latii.DcQBmber 1992
S3 8
Annex: 1C
6 1180/92

THE COURT
Chiuttr Berg, Appellate Court Judge
Gotta Grdberg, Appellate Court Judge Referee
Kxtttxna Brafieberg, Acting Appellate Court Judge
KEEPER OF THE MINUTES
The Referee
VARIOUSLY APPELLANT AMD OPPONENT (not present)
Karia SOFIA, Lmrm, net. rcg. no. 671029-75Q5»' Plangataa 4 C,
S-*ll 29 SANDVTKEN
Legal representative and counsel under &e Legal Aid Act: Anita Wallin Wiberg,
AttomeyHt-Uw, Box 1333. S-801 38 QAVLE
VARIOUSLY APPELLANT AND OPPONENT (sot present)
MASK Andrew fanon, b. 6.11.65, citizen of the United States of America, 69
E 600 N Proro, Utah 84606, USA
Legal rcareaexzative and. comae! under the Legal Aid Act: Bengt HexmeL
Attoxsey-at-iaw, Box 244. S-311 23 SANDVKEN
CAUSE
Temporary order concerning right of access to child etc.
DECTSTON CUNTES1HD
Made by the Sandviken District Court on 13th November 1992 in case no. T
33#1.

The case being presented by Trainee Deputy Judge Sten Ekstrand, the Court at
Appeal noted as follows.
In her application of 30th January 1991 far a writ of tnmmrnn against Mark
Larson. Sofia Lartoa prayed, the District Court TQ make a dcu.ee ahaotatr of
divorce between them and, also on an interlocutory basia. to award her custody
_ of their child JULIA Sofia, tax. rcg. no. 900*13-3929, and to order MetkLanon
y SEX. 1,078 nuiuieuaace monthly for dscir daughter, with «ffitc* from 38th

EXHI! IIT9
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January 1991 and until the child ia 18 yean old*, accrued amounts to be paid
immediately and subsequent amouni* in advance of each calendar mrmrft
Mark Larson hiving been served with the summons application and a special
injunction but nothing having been heardfromlxim thereafter, die District Court,
on IQQk May 1991 and until such tune a* these cucsaana were decided by a
judgement having three of law or pending decision to the contrary, the District
Court made an order in «*™Hnrir» with Sofia. Larson's poims of claim ia the
migpra of custody and maintenance, though without indicating tint accrued
amnuntt of maintenance vert to be paid immediately.
At a preliminary hearing on 2nd November 1992, Sofia Larson prayed the District
Court to make a decree absolute of divorce between the parties by part-judgement
and. also, on in interlocutory bails, m award her sole custody of their ^"eft*^
Julia and to order Mark Larson to pay her, as maintenance for their daughter,
SEK 1,075 monthly far the period between 1st January and 31at May 1991
inclusive, and SEJC 1,125 monthly as from 15* January 1992 and until the child
is 18 years old. Mark Larson consented to the divurca claim but contested cho
custody and ^imn-naTire clsixns. He confirms SEK 1,075 per month ai reasonable
maintenance but claimed chat he had discharged his maintenance obligation fcr the
period preceding 12th January 1992. For his own part, also on an interlocutory
basis, he claimed, in the first instance, sole custody of the dstightrr and
maintenance for her. In the second instance, in the event of Sofia Larson being
awarded custody of the daughter, Mark Larson also on an interlocutory basis,
prayed that he be awarded right of access to the daughter for mo continuous
months per annum between 1993 and 1997 and for six weeks per annum
thereafter* custody to be exercised in the USA. Sofia Larson contested Mark
Larson11 custody and maintenance claims. As regards the custody claim. Sofia
Larson consented to Mark Larson being entitled to access to the child three times
annually for one week at a time, the access to be exercised in her home or in
some other place on which the pardes were able to agree, but not in the USA.
On 13th November 1992, pending the determination of these maocn by a
jnrf^i !'inii.^iii K fnii-w nf law or drriiinn fn rhr rnntrary, the District Court
ordered as follow*:
(1)

Custody of the daughter of the parties, Julia, shall continue, ss ordered by
the District Court m its temporary aider of 10th May 1991, to be vested in
Sofia ljuson.

(2)

The District Courtfindsno cause to amend its temporary order of 10th May
1991 in the ™»"w of m*inrcnaxice* which order shall accordingly remain In
force.

(3)

Mark Larson shall be entitled to access to the daughter, Julia, for one

5

In its pan-judgment of 13th November 1992, the Diitric: Coun made a decree
absolute of divorce between the parties.
Sofia. Tarmn aod Mad: Linen have filed separate appeal against the Diuriet
Coon's order of 13th November 1992, and in doing so presented the following
points of claim.
Sofia Larson has prayed the Coozt of Appeal to set Mark Lanon's right of
temporary access to their daughter Julia at one week during the tummn term, one
w c A dnrfrig rfcy frpnrg ***** T*™ ™™ **•*»> in tfe^ auirrmer mrtnfhi. Shm faaS farther

atipulaad that the access shall take place in her home or in another place in
Sweden which ihs may inrHnam, that access may not be exercised during the
ChriHtmas and New Year holiday and cn.no occasion in the USA, and that the
time of access shall be decided two weeks in advance of each occasion, with
Made Lsraon notifying bar of his wishes.
Mark Larson has prayed the Court of Appeal to award him right of temporary
acceaa to the ***"ght?r of the panics, Julia, in the USA for a period of two
continuous tnonrhs annually, subject to his being obliged, not less than one month
before the time when he intends access to begin, to notify Sofia Larson accordingly, and also to set his temporary miTTtnflnrr! obligation to Sofia Larson at SEK
1,075 monthly as from 14th January 1992, payable in advance of each ralgndar
month.
Sofia Larson and Mark Larson have contested each other's amendment claims.
The Court of Appeal makes the following
FINAL ORDER
In view of the child's age and other circumstances, it is appropriate that Mark
Larson's rights of temporary access to the daughter. Julia, should be defined as
referring to access in Swtden and should mainly be arranged in accordance with
Sofia Larson's petition to Coun of Appeal.
In thernimrrof mainronanr* it follow* from the provisions of Chap. 7, Section
LS of the Code of Parenttood and Guardianship that a temporary mtinrwianfie
order can at any time be f-rmW by xhe Coun aa regards the ongoing maintenance obligation, whereas reappraisal of such an order, with retroactive effect,
shall not T^V* place |1f>t+i the ^ ^ haj been determined. Thus the decision
contested shall be deemed to comprise Mart Larson's obligation, for the period
from 13th November 1992 until the child is 13 years old, to pay SHE 1,078
jpmrnT+rump* joonthly for the daughter in advance of each ralrnri*r month. The
Court of Appeal find* no came for •mfmrling cbs order tins* m»d*.

z^'-^.Wlth reference to the above, the Caurt of Appeal amends the contested decision
x^naofar aa ths Court of Appeal, pending the detaiminjojon of the matter by judicial

;V

0036

6
decision or an order having gained force of law, or pending decision to tha
contrary, order* that Mark Larson ihall have a right of accen to the daughftn- of
the parties, Julia Sofia, nat. reg, no. 900813-3929, far one week between the
mnnrhi of January and May, two wqcKi between the mrmrbg of June and August
and one week bexcr* the nrnirfh^ of September and December, though not during
the Qiriumit or New Year holiday, Accetc may only be exetciced in Sweden,
at a place designated by Sofia T anion and at the exact times which, Mark Larson
having apprised Sofia Larson of hb preferences, haw been decided two weeks in
advance of every orcMinn
For services rendered in the Court of Appeal proceedings, the Court of Appeal
awards Anita Wailin Wberg SEK 1.780 and Bengt Kennel SEK 2,670 as
remuneration under the Legal Aid AnL
INSTRUCTIONS FDR APPEAL
Any appeal against the awards of remuneration to Anita Wallia WJberg and Bengt
Hcnnri ihall be made, by limited appeal, not later than Tuesday, 9th February
1993.
Under Chap. 2Q, Section 12(3) of the Code of Parenthood and Guardianship, no
appeal can be made against the Conn of Appeal's decision on other respects. For
instructions concerning prosecution of appeal proceedings, see enclosure.
(Signature:)
Keeper of the Mioztes
Record read and approved 12.1.1993/ (Initiate)
Given 12m January 1993
(Steam;)
COURT OF APPEAL FOR
SOUTHERN NOHRLAND
For a true copy,
(Signoturz)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTj v "''; ; ; f; \ Z- C 3
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVLSlCN." ;CV Gr VjTAiS

In the matter of:
JULIA LARSON,
A minor child.

*
*
*
*

Case No. 94-CV-87J

*

KARIN SOFIA OHLANDER, flea
KARIN SOFIA LARSON,

ORDER AND JTUDGMENT
*

Petitioner,
vs.

*
*
*

MARK ANDREW LARSON,
Respondent.

*
ak

This action came before the court, the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior
United States District Judge, presiding, on Friday, April 21, 1995, at 9:30 a.m., for a nonjury
trial. The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, based upon
the record and pursuant to this court's jurisdiction under article III, section 2 of the United
States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 11603 and the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980 (the Hague
Convention ), and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

Case No. 94-CV-87J
1.

The Petitioner is DENIED leave to withdraw her petition under the

Hague Convention, and Petitioner's motion to dismiss her Hague Convention petition is
DENIED.
2.

The Application for Withdrawal of Counsel for Petitioner is DENIED.

3.

The Petitioner's petition under the Hague Convention, filed in these

proceedings, is DENIED on the merits.
4.

The minor child, Julia Sofia Larson, is to be returned to the State of

Utah, so that the courts of the child's place of habitual residence, namely, Utah County, Utah,
United States of America, may determine the issue of custody. The Petitioner and Respondent
are hereby ordered to take all steps necessary to cause the return of the minor child, Julia Sofia
Larson, to the State of Utah so that a Utah state court can determine the issue of custody and
related matters. Once Julia Sofia Larson is returned to the State of Utah, no person shall
remove her from the State of Utah without an express written order of this court or of the state
court in Utah County, Utah, where the matter of custody is presently pending.
5.

This court respectfully requests the assistance of the Contracting States

in recognizing and enforcing this court's ruling under the Hague Convention.
6.

The court determines that this Order and Judgment fully resolves the

Petitioner's Hague Convention claims. The court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay in entering this order as a final, appealable judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b), and directs that this Order and Judgment be so entered.

2

Case No. 94-CV-87J
7.

The Respondent's claims for an award and judgment of attorney fees and

other expenses incurred in these proceedings are hereby reserved.
8.

Except as modified by this Order and Judgment, the court's Order of

August 15, 1994, shall remain in full force and effect.
9.

This Order and Judgment shall remain in full force and effect pending

any appeal thereof unless stayed by further order of this court or the court of appeals.
MADE AND ENTERED this \3~ day of June, 1995.
BY THE COURT

BRUCE'S. JENKIN
SENIOR UNITED^STA'

DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby cattyflattteamnddocumertbataM
and correct oofyo*t»ortg**OOlitotf*oao».
ATTEST: MARKU8&2MUai
CtafcUt&GMfctCHrt

OatK
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SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE
CTTJDGM2N?

COURT
Case

no.

4S2S-1995
delivered in Stockholm on Decerrber 2C , 1995

COMPLAINANT
Sofia Ohlander, personal identification no. S71C297505, of Plangatan 6 C, 311 39 Sandvi:<en
Representative and counsel under the Legal Aid Act:
Anita Tallin Wiberg, Attorney-a::-lav, Advokatfirman
Hahne & Co, Box 1333, 801 33 G^vie
OWQSZTE

PARTY

Mark Larson, date of birth November 5, 1965, of 636
South S50 East, Orera, Utah 84C5S, USA
Representative and counsel under the Legal Aid Act:
Fredric Renstron, Attorr.ey-at-lav, 3irger Jarlsgatan
13,
111 45 Stockholm
APPEAL

AGAINST

A

COURT

DECISION

Judgment delivered by Sundsvail Administrative Court
of Appeal on August 25, 1995 in case no. 2513-1995
•Annex)
MATTER
Return of a child pursuant to the Act (1989:14)
concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Decisions relating to Custody etc. and
concerning the Return of Children.

y

"IQ-JAH-98 ONS 0 8 : 0 0

RP^RT CROFTS

ftB

S.i»,4UUU4

FAXNR. 062AL&68

2
DEMANDS

ETC •

Sofia Chlcuidei. demands that the Supreme
Administrative Court alter the judgment c£ the
Administrative Court of Appeal, dismissing Hark
Larson'3 suit and withdrawing that judgment• she
also demands chat the Supreme Administrative Court
shall obtain information/a report from the social
welfare committee in'Sur.dsvall about Julia's present
home conditions and that this report ehculd be
completed with a report from the Children's and
Adolescents' Psychiatric Clinic for the purpose of
establishing how the child has adjusted to Sweden and whether returning her would entail serious risks
co her mental or physical health. In support: of her
suit in respect of the return of Julia, Sofia
Chlander has adduced the following. After Ir^er birth
Julia has resided in Sweden ever since November/
195 0, with the exception of seven months during 1991
and two months at the turn of 1953/1994. ;&*rk Larson
tcck the law into his own hand3 when he zetched *
Julia in November, 1?93. In 1992 and 1993 Mark Larson took part in the Swedish custody proceedings,
thus accepting Swedish jurisdiction. In view of
Sofia 6hlanderls intension of remaining in Sweden
with Julia and the length of time that Julia has
spent in Sweden, her adjustment tc this country and
Hark Larscn's passivity, it must be concluded that
in February, 13S4 Julia's habitual residence was
Sandviken.
Mark Larson contests the granting of the appeal and
the demand that the Supreme Administrative Court
arrange for further investigation in the case. In
support cf his suit he has adduced the following, he
has never accepted that Julia should live in Sweden.
nor that Sofia inlander should have custody of her.
Julia was residing m the USA in January/February,
1994 when Sofia Ohiander unlawfully abducted h*r.
Subsequently, Sofia Ohlander has prevented all
contacts between him and Julia.
In its decision of August 30, 1995 the Supreme
Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of
the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal
with regard to the return cf Julia.
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The evidence in the case has established the
following facts. Mark Larson and Sofia Ohlander were
riarried en October 27, 198S in the USA and their
daughter Julia was born there en August 13. 1990,
The family went to Sweden in November, 199 Q, after
which Mark Larson returned to the USA alone in the
beginning of January, 1591. That same .month Sofia
Ohlander filed a petition for divorce and sole
custody of Julia at Sandviken District Court. In
May, 1S91 she was awarded temporary custody of her
daughter. In June. 1591 she went to the USA with
Julia, but returned to Sweden in January, 19 92/ on
which occasion she took her daughter with her
without Mark Larson's consent. When the qualifying
period for the divorce e^^pired, Sofia Ohlander
proceeded with her divorce suit. In November, 1992
verbal proceedings were held in the divorce case, as
a result of which Sofia Ohlander was awarded
continued temporary custody of her daughter ^r.d Mark
Larson was granted visiting rights. In May, 1993
•Eark Larson paid a short visit to Sweden. The couple
were divorced the same year. In November, 1993 Mark
and his new wife visited Sweden, <>ir+d subsequently
took Julia to the USA without Sofia Ohlander's
consent. In January, 1594 Sofia Chlander went to th«
USA. Under an ex parte order she was provisionally
awarded custody of Julia without the right to leave
the USA. Kowevo r# on February 2, 1SS4 she took Julia
with her to Sweden, where they have lived «ver
since. On January 27, 1595 Kark Larson filed a
petition with the Gaviebory County Administrative
Court for the return of Julia to the USA under the
Act (1939:14) concerning the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Decisions relating to Custody
etc. and concerning the P.eturr. of Children (the
Enforcement Act} .
The provisions cf the Enforcement Act concerning the
return of children are based on the Convention
adopted by the Hague Conference in 1950 on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague
Convention). A general objective of the Convention
is to protect children against the harmful effects
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of being uprooted fror. their familiar <anvironment.
For thi3 purpose the Convention includes provisions
naking it possible for a child who has been
unlawfully abduct ad from one State Party to another
to be speedily returned cc the former 3c as to
restore the status quo. The Convention has bean
incorporated into Swedish law insofar as provisions
intended to reproduce the provisions of th*
Convention have been included in the Enforcement
Act. The section that is most relevant to the case
is section 11 of the Enforcement Act, which
corresponds to Articles 3 and 12, paragraph 1 of Che
Hague Convention. As will be explained in greater
detail below, the main issue in this case is whether
the abduction of Julia on February 2, 1994 from the
USA to Sweden was unlawful within the meaning cf the
above section.
Pursuant to section 11, subsection 1 cf the
Enforcement Act, a chile who has unlawfully been
brought to this country, or who is unlawfully held
in custody here, shall upon demand be returned to
the person froa whom the child is biting withheld if
the child resided in a State Party immediately pr-ior
to the abduction cr holding in custody. Oncer
section 11, subsection 2. an abduction or holding in
custody is unlawful if it conflicts with the
guardian's or ancchcx person's right to the custody
of the child in the state where the child resided
immediately prior to the abduction cr holding in
custody, provided that this right was exercised at
the time when the child was abducted or held in
custody, or would have been exercised if the
abduction or holding in custody had not taken place.
Under the Act the question o£ who was the child's
guardian at the time of the abduction and the
question of whether the abduction was unlawful is to
be decided in accordance with the law in the 5 U t «
in which the child resided at the tima of the
abduction (section 11, subsection 2 and the special
statement of reasons on this section in Gov. Bill
1933/89:8, p. 4C; see also the provisions of
sections 14 and 23, subsection 1 of the Act).
Another consequence of these provisions is that the
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abduction of a child from another stale tc Sweden is
not unlawful within the meaning of the Act if the
child resided in Sweden immediately prior to the
abducticn. The meaning of the tern; residence is thus
crucial to the application of the provisions of the
Snforca-^aenc Act that relate to the return of a
child.
A Swedish court deciding on a petition to return a
child from Sweden to another country must make an
independent decision on the residence of the child
at the tirr.e to which section 11. subsection 2 of the.
Enforcement Act is applicable. The terr. residence is
net defined in the Enforcement Act. In the
legislative history of the Act (Gcv. 3ili 1933/59:8,
pp. 36 and 40) reference was rsade to the
pronouncements on residence made in connection with
the incorporation in 1973 of this term in chapter 7,
section 2 of the Act (1904:26 s. 1) on Certain
Matters of International Law concerning Carriage and
Guardianship. (The pronouncements are contained in
Gov. Bill 1973:153. ^T>. 73). This definition and the
pronouncements in the Sill cited above formed the
basis of the definition of the tern residence
applied in subsequent Swedish legislation and in
case law on international family law and related
fields (sec, for example, Gov. Bills 1932/83:38, pp.
22 ff. ana ISS4/SS:124, p. 40, and NCA (New
Juridical Archives] 1977, p. 706, 1383, p. 359 and
1937, p. 600).
Thus, although the legislative histcry cf the
Enforcement Act refers to the need, in connection
with the application of the provisions of the Act
that relate to the return of a child, to tak* into
account the definition of the term residence used in
other national legislation, it nust nevertheless be
borne in irind that the Enforcement Act is ar* Act
governed by the provisions of o-n. international
convention. In interpreting this concept it is
therefore appropriate tc take particular notice of
the terminology ^r.d purpose of the Hague Convention.
The expression '• residence7 in the Enforcement Act
corresponds to the expression "h&bitual residence"
or "residence habituelle* in the Hague Convention.
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This concept has long been well-established within
the framework on the Hague Conference, and it is
used in several cf the conventions adopted by the
Conference. These conventions do not contain an
explicit definition of the concept, but according to
the references in the relevant literature the term
relates primarily to the. actual circumstances (see,
inter alia, the summary in SOU {Gov. Official
Reports) 1976:39, pp. 119-122)- 3asicaily, an allround appraisal must be made of such verifiable
circumstances as the length .of the st3y and social
attachments *nd other circumstances of a personal cr
professional nature that indicate a lasting
connection with one country or the other. The
individual's intention whether or not to stay in the
country of residence can also be taken into account.
but the current view appears to be that, as a rule,
no great importance should be attached to subjective
factors. In the case of a child who is not old
enough to make it possible to consider his or her
intentions regarding the future, other circumstances
- in particular, the residence of the guardian, and
the horse and social conditions - nust obviously be
decisive. The question has been formulated in terms
of where the child's "effective life center" is (cf.
SCC 1976:39, p. 120 and Gov. Bill 1534/35:24, p.
42) . A point that should always be considered when
interpreting the tenr, "habitual residence'1, as well
as the Swedish concept of rasidence, i* that the
purpose of the rules containing the term should be
taken into account, and that interpretations may
therefore differ depending on the context.
A special issue as regards the residence of small
children is what rules to apply in cases where the
parents have joint custody of the child and the
child is moved from one country to another against
the will of one of th^ guardians. It. hes been
asserted on various occasions that such changes of
residence should not result in the child acquiring a
new residence (see, for example, the references
quoted by 3cgdan in Tidskrift for Juridiska
Foreningen i Finland 19 32, p. 118, note 38. and NJA
1395, p. 241). However, the sphere of application of
this principle is not clear (cf. 3ogdan,
ibid,.
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118-112, ?4Lssan, Svensk rlttspraocis i
international faic.il je- och arvsratt, p-p. 104-103
and NJA 1974, p. 330 and p. 529 I and II) . With
particular reference to the Enforcement Act and the
Hague Convention on which it is based, it should be
taken into account chat one general objective, as
has already been mentioned, is to protect children
against the harmful effaces of being uprooted from
their familiar environment, and that one of the
functions cf the term residence for the purposes of
the Act, like "habitual residence" in the
Convention, is to specify the kind of connection
with a country that g i v « the right to protection
under the Act and the Convention, respectively. It
is not consistent with this objective for an
abduction against the will of one of the child's
guardians to be instrumental in changing the child's
residence- On the ether hand, it does not seem
entirely consistent vith that objective to regard
the circumstances cf the abduction as a permanent
obstacle to the establishment of a new residence. If
the child has been in the new country for such a
length of time and under such conditions that it has
acquired a ccrnfrr.ior. with the country of the kind
referred to in the provisions, there should be no
cbstacle to considering that it has acquired a new
residence. Particular note should be taken in this
connection of the fact that under the provisions of
section 12 of the Enforcement Act, as well as
Article 12 cf the Convention, the return of a child
that has been unlawfully abducted may be refused
where, at the time of the submission of an
application for the child's return, at least one
year has passed from the time of abduction and the
child has settled dovr. in its new environment,
A matter that must be resolved in this case is
whether the abduction of Julia from the USP. to
Sweden in February, 19 34 was unlawful within the
•ir.ear.ing of tha Enforcement Act. From the abov^
remarks it is clear that the abduction cannot be
regarded as unlawful if Julia's residence at the
time of the abduction was Sweden* Che evidence shews
that Julia arrived in Sweden together with her
mother Sofia Ohlander in January, 1992 and that she
subsequently lived with her mother in Sandviken up
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until November. 19S3, when Marx. Larson tock her to
the USA without her mother's consent. Nor is there
any doubt that Sofia Chlander acquired Swedish
residence after her arrival in Sweden. The
circumstances related above and the other
information that has been supplied about Julia's
stay with her mother and her adjustment to
conditions in Sandviken also clearly indicate that
she had acquired Swedish residence some time prior
to her abduction to the USA in November, 1993,
However, in conformity with the acovs reasoning, the
circumstances in which Julia was taken back to
Sw<ad^r. in January, 1392 should also be taken into
account in an assessment of her residential status.
The investigation supports Mark Larson's claim that
the abduction tock place against his will. However,
he did not file a petition for the return of the
child following the abduction. Considering this
fact, the circumstances in connection with the
abduction in January, 1SS2 should not. on expiry of
the tveive-menth period referred to in both the
Enforcement Act and the Convention, prevent the •
child from acquiring residence in Sweden. In view of
the above account of Julia's stay in Sweden and her
adjustment to Swedish conditions, the Supreme
Administrative Ccurt finds that she must be
considered to have acquired Swedish residence some
time before November, 1993, when she was tak«& back
tc the USA by Mark Larson. The subsequent events Julia*s abduction to the USA and her stay tr.ere
lasting over :wo months • cannot once again have
changed r^z: residential status. Consequently,
pursuant to section 11, subsection 2 of the
Enforcement Act, she must be deemed still to have
had Swedish residence at the time of the abduction
from the USA in February, 19S4 that is at issue in
this case.
The abduction in February, 1S9 4 was therefore not
unlawful within the meaning of section 11,
subsection 2 of the Enforcement Act. Consequently,
the provisions of the Enforcement Act offer no
possibility of returning Julia to the USA. Sofia
Ohlander's main suit shall therefore be granted.
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In view of this ruling, no measures arcs necessary
with regard to Sofia Chlar.der's demand for further
investigation in respect of Julia. ;
The matter of the parties' legal coses remains to be
settled. Sofia Shlander's suit implicitly includes a
demand that she be released from the obligation to
pay Mark Larson's legal costs in the Lower courts.
This rratter must be decided in accordance with the
provisions of section 21 of the Snforcement Act and
chapter 21, section 13, subsection 1 of the Code on
Parents, Children and Guardians. Under those
provisions the court may, where this- is deemed
reasonable, order a party to pay the other party's
legal costs. Cn the basis of an overall assessment
cf the case the Supreme Administrative Court finds
that there is no reasonable cause for either cf the
parties to be obliged to pay the other party's legal
costs. Shis applies to the parties' legal costs both
in the lower courts and in the Supreme
Administrative Court. Therefore, Sofia inlander's
suit shall also be granted in this regard.

DECISION OF

THS

SUPREME

ADMINISTRATIVE

COURT

The Supreme Administrative Court reverses the
judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal and
upholds the judgment of the County Administrative
Court in the matter of the return cf the child.
Reversing the judgment of the Administrative Court
of Appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court releases
Sofia Ohlander from the obligation to pay Mark
Larson's legal costs in the lower court3.
The Supreme Administrative Court rules that
remuneration shall be paid under the Legal Aid Act
in the amount of 16 213 kronor tc Anita Wallin
wiberg, Attorr.ey-at-law, fsr her work as counsel for
Sofia Ohlander and in the amount of 12 4C2 kronor to
Fredric Renstrom, Atzcmey-ac-law, for his work as
counsel for Mark Larscn. Neither party shall be
obliged to pay the other party's legal costs in the
Supreme Administrativ« Court.
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Stig Brink

/signature/
Elisabeth Palm

/signature/
Sigvard Berglof

/signature/
Anders Swartling

/signature/

/signature/
A m e Baekxevold

/signature/
Anna-Sarin Koffshedc
Reading Clerk to the Supreir*
Administrative Court
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HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARK ANDREW LARSON,
Plaintiff,

]
I
>
I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
NUNC PRO TUNC

-vsKARIN SOFIA LARSON, aka
KARIN SOFIA OHLANDER,
Defendant.

]
)
]>

Civil No. 944402943

This matter came on regularly for hearing on October 18, 1996,
Plaintiff being present and represented by his attorney, Brian C.
Harrison, and the Defendant being represented by her attorney,
Daniel Bertch, and the parties' minor child being represented by
the Guardian Ad Litem, Lorie Fowlke.

The Court, having considered

057Q

the argument of counsel and having reviewed the file and being
fully advised in the premises, hereby enters its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Mark Andrew Larson ("Mark") is a U.S. citizen

and Defendant
Sweden.

Karin

Sofia Ohlander

("Sofia") is a citizen of

The parties were married on October 27, 1989/ in South

Jordan, Utah, and established their marital home in Utah County,
Utah.

Thereafter Sofia began the immigration process and became a

permanent resident of the United States.
2.

Plaintiff is presently a resident of Utah County, Utah,

and has been for more than three (3) months immediately prior to
the commencement of this action.
3.

Irreconcilable

differences

have

arisen

between

the

parties making the continuation of the marriage impossible.
4.

There has been one

(1) child born as issue of this

marriage, to wit: Julia Sofia Larson

("Julia"), born August 13,

1990, in Provo, Utah.
5.

Mark should be awarded the care, custody and control of

2
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said

minor

child

subject

to

Sofia's

reasonable

rights

of

visitation,
6.

Neither party should be awarded alimony from the other.

7.

Sofia should be required to pay child support to Mark

according to the child support schedules adopted in the State of
Utah.
8.

The present distribution of personal property of the

parties should be confirmed.
9.

Each party should be ordered to assume and pay their own

debts incurred during the marriage and since the separation.
10.

Plaintiff should be granted a Decree of Divorce, Nunc Pro

Tunc, effective October 21, 1993.
11.

At the end of 1990 the parties went on vacation with

their child to Sweden to visit Sofia's family for Christmas, with
the intent to return to their home in Utah in January 1991. At the
end of the visit, Sofia decided to remain in Sweden and went into
hiding with the child, refusing to tell Mark where she and the
child were or to allow the child to return home with Mark to Utah.
Mark had to return to Utah by himself in mid-January 1991.
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12.

Sofia commenced a divorce and custody action in Sweden on

January 30, 1991.
13.

By means of phone calls over the next few months, Mark

persuaded Sofia to return with their child to their home in Utah,
which she did on June 3, 1991.

Sofia assured Mark

that she

considered their reconciliation to be complete and unconditional,
and that she was having her lawyer dismiss her Swedish divorce and
custody action,

in which she had obtained a default

custody order in her favor.

temporary

Mark believed and relied upon Sofia's

assurances.
14.

The parties and their child lived together as a family in

Utah until January 13, 1992, upon which date Sofia abandoned Mark
without warning and moved to Sweden, taking their minor child with
her without Mark's foreknowledge or consent and directly against
his will.
15.

Sofia then petitioned for the divorce and custody matters

in the action she had filed in Sweden in 1991 to be finalized,
which action she had not dismissed as she had led Mark to believe.
16.

Mark inquired of several attorneys, as well as a consular
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officer at the United States Embassy in Sweden, regarding his legal
options, but he was not informed about his rights under the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(1980), an international treaty requiring that wrongfully abducted
children

be

returned

promptly

to

their

country

of

habitual

residence.
17.

Mark

attempted

to negotiate

a resolution with

Sofia

through their Swedish attorneys, but Sofia demanded sole custody of
Julia and insisted that any visitation between Mark and Julia must
take place in Sweden under her personal supervision.
18.

Mark continually attempted to maintain contact with his

daughter, but Sofia allowed only very restricted contact, and for
the 3 month period, from February 7 to May 13, 1992, she cut off
all contact between Mark and Julia.
19.
daughter.

In October 1992 Mark traveled to Sweden to try to see his
He spent 2 weeks there, during which time Sofia allowed

him to see Julia for a total of less than 14 hours, and only inside
her apartment under her personal supervision.
20.

Mark again traveled to Sweden in May 1993.

Despite a
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Swedish temporary visitation order in Sofia's Swedish divorce case
purporting to grant Mark 4 full weeks per year of unsupervised
visitation with his daughter, Sofia only allowed Mark to see Julia
during specified daytime hours on seven consecutive days, under her
constant personal supervision.
21.

After further investigation regarding his legal rights,

Mark came to believe that the Swedish court did not have proper
jurisdiction over the divorce or custody matters and that the
proper forum for these matters was Utah, so he filed for divorce
and custody in this Court in June 1993

(Case No. 934401196) .

A

decree of divorce between the parties was entered by this Court on
October 21, 1993, in which the issue of custody was reserved.
22.

After

entry

of

that

divorce

decree, Mark

remarried.

However, that decree was subsequently vacated on February 27, 1995,
due to insufficiency of service upon Sofia.
23.

Mark filed this nunc pro

19, 1994.
27,

tunc

divorce action on December

Sofia was personally served in this action on December

1994,

participated

and

has

appeared

generally

and

has

continuously

in this matter and has been represented by local
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counsel.
24.
Julia.

In November 1993 Mark and his wife went to Sweden to see

Again Sofia only allowed Mark to see Julia during specified

daytime hours and mostly inside her apartment/ but on an occasion
outside

Sofia's

apartment Mark and his wife

eluded

Sofia

and

brought Julia back to Utah.
25.

Immediately

upon returning

to Utah/

in an effort

to

maintain contact between Julia and Sofia/ Mark telephoned Sofia and
informed her that Julia was with him in the United States and that
she was safe and happy.

Julia spent the next two months living

with Mark and his wife in Utah.
26.

Mark speaks Swedish fluently, and his wife is also quite

proficient

in Swedish.

With

their help,

Julia became

fairly

proficient in English during the two months that she lived with
them and could even read simple English words and count well past
twenty.

Julia also developed close/ trusting relationships with

both her father and his wife during this time.
27.

During this time Mark took Julia to the dentist because

he was concerned about what appeared to him to be significant decay
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of at least eight of her teeth.

Mark obtained an estimate from the

dentist stating that it would cost approximately $1006 to repair
the damage to her teeth.

Mark was unable to have this dental work

completed because of Sofia's subsequent illegal removal of Julia
from the United States on February 1, 1994.
28.

In late December 1993, Mark received a telephone call

from Lloyd
informed

Eldredge,

Mark

that

a Utah attorney

Sofia

intended

representing

to

file

an

Sofia.

action

He

in Utah

alleging that Mark had wrongfully removed Julia from Sweden in
violation

of

the

Hague

Convention

International Child Abduction.

on

the

Civil

Aspects

of

This was the first Mark had heard

of the Hague Convention.
29.

On January

26, 1994, Sofia

filed a Hague

Convention

action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah (Civil
Action No. 94-CV-87J) . On the same date Sofia secured a temporary
ex parte

Order for Issuance of Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habeas

Corpus, which ordered the issuance of a warrant directing any peace
officer within Utah to take Julia into protective custody and
release her to Sofia.

This temporary order also set the case for
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a hearing on February 1, 1994, and ordered that Sofia or her agent
not remove Julia from the State of Utah pending further order of
the Federal Court.

According to the Federal Court's Findings of

Fact in that case/ the said ex parte

Order did not affect the

status of the parties' legal custody rights.
30.

In compliance with that ex parte Order/ and in an effort

to spare his daughter the trauma of being taken into protective
custody/ Mark arranged to deliver Julia directly to Sofia/ which he
did in the presence of a U.S. Marshal on January 30/ 1994.
31.

Two days later/ on February 1/ 1994/ Sofia fled from the

United States to Sweden with the parties' child/ in violation of
the ex parte Order she had secured from the Federal Court.
32.

On February 17/ 1994/ the Federal Court entered an Order

to Show Cause requiring Sofia to return to Utah with the child and
show cause why she should not be found in contempt of court for her
willful disobedience of the Federal Court Order. Sofia refused to
comply with the Order to Show Cause, and on August 15/ 1994/ the
Federal

Court

issued

an

Order

finding

Sofia

in

contempt

and

requiring her to cause Julia to be returned to the State of Utah
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and the Federal Court within 30 days.

Again, Sofia refused to

comply.
33.

For over 2 years and 4 months

following her

illegal

removal of Julia from Utah on February 1, 1994, Sofia actively
prevented all contact between Mark and his daughter.

During this

time Mark made diligent efforts to re-establish contact with his
child, including making regular calls to Sofia's phone number and
leaving messages on her answering machine, as well as employing the
assistance of a consular officer at the American Embassy in Sweden
in an attempt to persuade Sofia to allow him to at least speak with
his daughter on the phone, but all his efforts were fruitless.
34.

On June 12, 1995, the United States District Court for

the District of Utah entered its final judgment on the merits of
Sofia's Hague Convention case.

The Court's ruling included the

following:
a.

Utah is the only place Julia has ever lived with the

consent of both parents;
b.

Julia has been habitually resident in Utah County,

Utah, continuously since her birth in August 1990;
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c.

Under the Hague Convention, the proper forum for an

adjudication of the parties' custody and visitation rights with
respect to their daughter, Julia, is and always has been the state
court in Utah County, Utah (i.e. this Court);
d.

Sofia's retention of Julia in Sweden in 1991 and her

removal of Julia from Utah to Sweden in 1992 were wrongful under
the Hague Convention;
e.

Any participation by Mark in Sofia's Swedish divorce

action was without full knowledge or understanding of his legal
rights, and did not amount to a waiver of any Hague Convention
rights or remedies;
f.

None of the temporary custody orders obtained by

Sofia in Sweden have ever been granted legal recognition under the
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 7845c-l through -26 (1992 & Supp. 1994):
g.

Mark's right of joint legal custody of Julia has

never been terminated under Utah law;
h.

Mark's

return

of

Julia

from

Sweden

to Utah

in

November 1993 was lawful under the Hague Convention and had the
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effect of restoring Julia to her habitual residence in Utah;
i.
necessary
Larson#

Both

parties

were

ordered

to

"take

all

to cause the return of the minor child/

to the State of Utah so that a Utah

steps

Julia Sofia

state court

determine the issue of custody and related matters."

can

In its ruling

the Federal Court also officially requested "the assistance of the
Contracting

States

in recognizing

and

enforcing

[the

federal]

court's ruling under the Hague Convention."
35.

Sofia

continues

to

willfully

defy

the

final

Hague

Convention judgment from the Federal Court.
36.

The Findings of Fact/ Conclusions of Law and Order and

Judgment of the U.S. District Court in the above-mentioned action
are

entitled

to

full

faith

and

credit

from

this

Court/

in

accordance with Article IV of the Constitution of the United States
of American and U.S.C. 11603 (a) .
37.
found

The U.S. District Court in the above-mentioned judgment

that

"No substantive action has occurred

in the Swedish

divorce suit since the [Swedish] Court of Appeal made its order in
January 1993" (regarding temporary visitation)/ and that "No final
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hearing has been held in the [Swedish] District Court on the issues
of custody and visitation."

Nothing has been presented to this

Court to suggest that these circumstances have changed.
38.

On February 16, 1995, Sofia appeared specially in this

action and filed a Motion to Dismiss, contesting
jurisdiction.

this Court's

At the hearing on her Motion on May 10, 1996, Sofia

withdrew her objection and requested time to file an Answer to
Mark's divorce and custody complaint, which she subsequently filed
on May 30, 1995.
39.

Due to Sofia's defiance of the Hague Convention judgment

from the Federal Court, Mark was required to travel to Sweden to
seek enforcement of the judgment through a Hague Convention court
action in that country.
40.

Mark and his wife spent two and one-half months in Sweden

pursuing

the case through the trial court and appellate court

levels.

During this entire time Sofia hid Julia from Mark and

actively prevented
despite

extensive

all contact between Mark and his daughter,
efforts

by Mark,

his

Swedish

attorney,

the

American Embassy in Stockholm, and various Swedish authorities to

13

05

arrange for such contact.
41.

While in Sweden Mark read and saw numerous newspaper

articles and television news reports in which Sofia was interviewed
by the Swedish media.

During several of the television interviews/

and also reportedly many of the newspaper interviews, Sofia had
Julia with her and sometimes even participating in the interviews,
while Sofia discussed her viewpoint on the parties' conflict over
Julia and made very derogatory statements about Julia's father,
including saying that he did not really care about Julia and only
wanted her for a status symbol.
42.

While in Sweden Mark also obtained a videotape copy of a

half-hour television docu-drama that aired throughout Scandinavia,
which portrayed Sofia's version of the parties' conflict over their
daughter.

In it, Sofia was interviewed at length, with Julia by

her side, and Julia was used as an actor to portray herself in
professional ^re-enactments" depicting her being abducted by her
father and found and rescued by her mother, both of whom were
played by professional actors.
43.

The

Swedish

lower

court

denied

Mark's

petition

for
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Julia's return under the Hague Convention treaty, but on August 25,
1995, the Swedish appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling
and ordered that Julia be returned to the United States, and that
Sofia must turn Julia over to Mark on or before August 31, 1995,
with enforcement by the Swedish police if Sofia did not comply.
44.

Sofia continued to hide Julia from Mark, and on August

30, 1995, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court gave Sofia leave
to

appeal

the

Swedish

appellate

court

ruling

and

stayed

its

enforcement.
45.

Sofia has also appealed the Federal Court judgment to the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

However, she has been

denied any stay of the judgment.
46.

On October 12, 1995, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause

hearing held October 10, 1995, at which Sofia was represented by
counsel, this Court ordered Sofia to strictly comply with the
Federal Court judgment and to immediately turn Julia over to Mark
for return to Utah.

On October 17, 1995, upon Sofia's motion, this

Court modified its order by granting Sofia until November 13, 1995,
to present herself and Julia to the Court, and ordered that if she
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failed to do so she must turn Julia over to Mark for immediate
return to Utah.
47.

Sofia willfully refused to comply in any respect.

At a hearing on November 17, 1995, at which Sofia was

represented by counsel, this Court found Sofia in contempt for her
refusal to obey its order dated October 17, 1995, issued a pick-up
order

for the child,

attorneys fees.

and ordered

Sofia

to pay Mark

$750

for

The Court also ordered Sofia to appear in person

at a hearing on December 8, 1995, otherwise a warrant would issue
for her arrest.

After a telephone conference with the parties'

respective counsel on November 30, 1995, the Court further ordered
Sofia to file an affidavit within 7 days disclosing the address
where she and Julia were living.

Sofia failed to comply with these

orders in any respect, and at the hearing on December 8, 1995,
Sofia was again found in contempt and a warrant was issued for her
arrest.
48.

On December 20, 1995, the Swedish Supreme Administrative

Court reversed the ruling of the Swedish appellate court and ruled
that Sweden would not respect the final judgment of the Federal
Court under the Hague Convention treaty and would not order the
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return of Julia to the United States.

The Swedish ruling does not

purport to deal with or dispose of the issue of custody.
49.

Pursuant to an Order to Show Cause hearing on January 17,

1996, at which Sofia was represented by counsel, this Court entered
a temporary custody order on March 19, 1996, awarding sole custody
of Julia to Mark and ordering Sofia to immediately return Julia to
Utah, to pay to Mark an additional $750, and to pay Mark child
support in accordance with the Utah state child support guidelines.
Sofia willfully refused to comply in any respect.
50.

At an Order to Show Cause hearing on June 11, 1996, at

which Sofia was represented by counsel, this Court ordered Sofia to
initiate a weekly telephone conversation between Mark and Julia
every Thursday at 10:00 a.m. Utah time.

As of October 18, 1996,

when this case went to trial, Sofia had complied with only 13 of
the 19 ordered weekly phone conversations between Mark and Julia,
and she personally monitored

those conversations which she had

allowed.
51.

Also at the June 11 hearing, Mark made a formal offer to

pay all necessary expenses for Sofia and Julia to come to Utah for
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the final custody hearing/ including round-trip travel expenses/ up
to $500 per month for lodging in Utah/ and reimbursement for up to
3 months
forfeit.

of

lost wages

and

for any

tuition

fees Sofia might

Although this offer was conveyed to Sofia by her counsel/

Sofia refused to return with Julia to Utah,
. 52.

At a hearing on July 2 # 1996/ upon Sofia's motion this

Court appointed Ms. Lorie Fowlke as Guardian Ad Litem for Julia.
On July 31/ 1996/ Ms. Fowlke traveled to Sweden and spent a week
there meeting with Julia/ Sofia/ Sofia's mother/ personnel at the
day

care

center where

Sofia has

Swedish counsel/ and others.

enrolled

Julia#

the parties'

Ms. Fowlke submitted a formal report

and recommendations to the Court on August 12, 1996.
53.

At the scheduled trial on August 14# 1996/ at which Sofia

was represented by counsel, this Court granted Sofia's motion for
a continuance and set a new trial date for October 18, 1996.
accordance with the written recommendations

In

of the Guardian Ad

Litem the Court ordered that temporary custody of Julia remain with
Mark/

that

parties

Sofia be granted

engage

in mediation/

reasonable
and

that

visitation/
Sofia

take

that
the

both

divorce
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education

class

by

watching

a

videotape

affidavit stating that she had done so.

and

then

filing

an

The Court further ordered

that Sofia file and serve answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents no later than September 1,
1996, which interrogatories had been served upon her nearly 12
months earlier, and that Sofia pay to Mark the two ordered $750
money judgments no later than October 1, 1996, which judgments had
been outstanding for 5 and 9 months, respectively.

This order was

entered on September 3, 1996, and except for some participation in
unsuccessful mediation, Sofia willfully failed to comply with it in
any respect.
54.

Mark has completed the mandatory divorce education class.

55.

Ever since at least February 1, 1994, Sofia has gone to

great effort to prevent Julia from having any contact with her
father.
allowed

The supervised phone contact which Sofia has recently
was

only

allowed

after

this

Court's

specific

order

requiring her to initiate weekly phone contact between Julia and
her father, which order Sofia has only partially complied with.
56.

Since her wrongful removal of Julia from this country in
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January 1992, Sofia has, against Mark's wishes, taught Julia that
her last name is Ohlander rather than Larson, although her correct
legal surname in both Sweden and the United States is Larson.
57.

This Court finds that Sofia has been acting in her own

self-interest and not in the best interests of the child.
58.

Sofia is in flagrant contempt

of the orders of this

Court, and this Court has no reason to expect that she would comply
with any visitation awarded to Mark if this Court were to grant her
custody of Julia.
59.
they

While Sofia and Mark were married and living together

shared

equally.

the

responsibility

for

and

care

of

Julia

fairly

During Sofia's wrongful retention of Julia in Sweden in

the first part of 1991 and subsequent to her wrongful removals of
Julia from the United States in January 1992 and February 1994,
Sofia has forcibly excluded Mark from the day to day care of Julia
through unlawful violations of his custody rights.
60.

Mark has been remarried for over three years and can

provide a stable family environment for Julia with himself, his
wife,

Julia's one year-old half-sister Natalie,

and any other
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children Mark and his wife may have in the future.

Mark has held

the same employment as an x-ray optics engineer at MOXTEK, Inc. for
over 6 years and plans to continue working there.

He has flexible

work hours and has therefore the latitude to deal with parental
responsibilities that may arise even during business hours. Mark's
wife is a full-time homemaker and mother/ and can therefore provide
full-time care for Julia while Mark is at work.

No such ability to

provide a stable family environment or constant primary care for
Julia

has

been

demonstrated

by

Sofia,

and

according

to

the

information provided to the Court by Sofia and the Guardian Ad
Litem/ Sofia has not remarried and has had Julia registered in day
care in Sweden continuously since August 1993.
61.

Mark

has

consistently

affirmed

to

this

Court

and

demonstrated that he feels that it is very important for Julia to
have a close/ loving relationship with her mother,

and that he

would work toward that goal if granted sole custody.

Mark's wife

has also attested to this same view and intent.

In contrast/ Sofia

has consistently and unequivocally demonstrated a clear disregard
for Julia's need to have a close/ loving relationship with her
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father.
62.

It is in the best interests of the parties minor child

that she be placed in an environment where there is considerablygreater likelihood that people will consider the true needs of the
child#

especially

her

need

to

relationship with both parents.

maintain

a

loving,

healthy

This is most likely to occur in

the home of Mark and his present wife, not in the home of Sofia.
63.

It is in Julia's best interests that she be in Mark's

sole custody.
64.

It is in Julia's best interests that there be a ™break-in

period" during which Sofia comes to Utah so that Julia can spend
time with her mother daily while in the custody of her father.
65.

It is in Julia's best interests that her relationship

with her mother continue via liberal visitation, both inside of
Utah and in the country of Sweden, but this must be arranged so as
to ensure that Sofia will not violate Mark's rights of custody of
Julia.
66.
residence,

In
it

light
is

of
in

the

Julia's

parties'
best
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differing

interests

that

countries
her

of

parents

actively help her acquire and maintain the ability to communication
fluently in both English and Swedish.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the divorce and custody

matters and personal jurisdiction over the parties.
2.
tunc,

Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce, nunc

pro

effective October 21, 1993.
3.

In accordance with Article IV of the Constitution of the

United States of America and U.S.C. 11603(a), this Court should
afford full faith and credit to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order and Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Utah, dated June 12, 1995, in the Hague Convention case
filed by Sofia.
4.

None of the temporary custody orders obtained by Sofia in

Sweden have ever been granted legal recognition under the Utah
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l
through -26 (1992 & Supp. 1994), and they have no legal force or
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validity in the State of Utah.
5.

Neither party should be awarded alimony.

6.

The present distribution of personal property and debts

should be confirmed.
7.

Permanent sole custody of the parties' minor child, Julia

Sofia Larson, is awarded to Mark.
8.

Sofia is awarded liberal visitation both in Utah and in

Sweden, subject to appropriate restrictions that will ensure that
she does not violate Mark's rights of custody.
9.

Both

parties

shall

actively

help

Julia

acquire

and

maintain the ability to communicate fluently in both English and
Swedish.
10.

Sofia shall immediately return Julia to Utah and turn her

over to Mark.

To assist in making the transition easier for Julia,

Sofia shall be allowed daily visitation with Julia in Utah during
an initial 3-week

u

break-in" period, which visitation shall be

arranged and overseen by the Guardian Ad Litem.
11.

If Sofia fails to turn Julia over to Mark within 14 days

of the entry of this decree, all law enforcement officers or other
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appropriate authorities of the State of Utah/ the United States of
American, the country of Sweden/ or any other jurisdiction where
the child may be located/ shall immediately pick up the parties'
minor child/ Julia Larson/ and turn her over to her father/ Mark
Larson.
12.

Mark is awarded child support from Sofia in accordance

with the Utah State child support guidelines.

Mark is not and

shall not be required to pay child support to Sofia for the times
when she is or has been unlawfully withholding Julia in violation
of his custody rights.

Mark is entitled

to claim Julia as a

dependent for tax purposes, starting on the tax return due April
15/ 1997.
13.

Sofia is in contempt of court for her willful violations

of this Court's orders dated March 19, 1996/ and September 3/ 1996.
14.

Sofia shall immediately pay Mark the two $750 judgments

already entered against her, as well as an additional $750 as a
sanction for her contempt of the temporary custody order dated
March

19,

Plaintiff's

1996/

and

$500

Interrogatories

for

her

and

25

willful

Requests

failure
for

to

answer

Production

of

Documents as ordered on September 3, 1996, for a total of $2,750.
15.

As long as either party remains a resident of the State

of Utah, this Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to modify,
negate, or supersede any of the terms of this decree.
16.

This Court respectfully requests the Swedish courts, law

enforcement officers, and other authorities to recognize, honor and
enforce this decree.
DATED t h i s

\"r

*L

day

of

JU

,

1997,

BY THE C O U R T A £ ? : C C^ - , v > % ^

IWrW/
JUDGE ANTJH'
DISTRICT CO
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copy of the foregoing on this

\9E^ day of T^pVJ^

1997,

by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Daniel Bertch
BERTCH & BIRCH
5296 S. Commerce Dr., #100
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Lorie Fowlke
Jeffs & Jeffs
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Secretary

*
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the Uncompahgre Reservation, and the three
disputed categories of non-trust lands discussed above.6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the
defendants' motion to recall our mandate in
Ute Indian Tribe III, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th
Cir.1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S.
994, 107 S.Ct. 596, 93 L.Ed.2d 596 (1986).
Rather, we MODIFY our mandate in Ute
Indian Tribe III as set out above and REMAND with instruction that the district
court consider the Tribe's request for permanent injunctive relief in light of this opinion.

p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

*>

Karin Sofia OHLANDER, In the Matter of
Julia Larson, a Minor Child, f/k/a Karin
Sofia Larson, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Mark Andrew LARSON, RespondentAppellee.
Nos. 95-4114 & 96-4080.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
June 3, 1997.
After father took child from Sweden to
United States without mother's permission,
^mother, a Swedish citizen, filed Hague Convention petition seeking child's return to
Sweden. Mother subsequently took child
from United States to Sweden, in violation of
court order, and was found in contempt. Father then filed Hague Convention petition in
Sweden for return of child to United States.
Mother filed motion to voluntarily dismiss
her district court petition. The United
6. We decline to address whether any portion of
the non-trust lands opened in 1905 might still
constitute Indian country under section 1151 (b)
as a "dependent Indian community" because

States District Court for the District of Utah,
Bruce S. Jenkins, J., denied motion, and
subsequently ordered child's return to United States. Mother appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Brorby, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
district court abused its discretion in denying
motion to dismiss solely on basis of mother's
contempt of its order not to remove child,
and (2) dismissal of mother's petition was
warranted.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Murphy, Circuit Judge, dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Federal Courts <S=*818
Court of Appeals will review district
court's decision to deny voluntary dismissal
after defendant has filed answer for abuse of
discretion. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2),
28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1700
Absent legal prejudice to defendant, district court normally should grant voluntary
dismissal after defendant has filed answer.
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28
U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1700
In determining whether defendant
would suffer legal prejudice from voluntary
dismissal after defendant has filed answer,
district court should consider, among other
relevant factors, defendant's effort and expense in preparing for trial, excessive delay
and lack of diligence on part of plaintiff,
insufficient explanation of need for dismissal,
and present stage of litigation. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700
Each factor considered in determining
whether defendant would suffer legal prejudice from voluntary dismissal after defendant
has filed answer need not be resolved in
favor of plaintiff for dismissal to be appropriate, nor need each factor be resolved in favor
that question is not properly before the court.
The district court may be asked to consider the
question upon remand.
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of defendant for denial of motion to be proper. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28
U.S.C.A.
5. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700
In determining whether to grant voluntary dismissal after defendant has filed answer, district court should endeavor to insure
that substantial justice is afforded to both
parties. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28
U.S.C.A.
6. Federal Civil Procedure <3>1693,1700
In determining whether to grant voluntary dismissal after defendant has filed answer, court must consider equities not only
facing defendant, but also those facing plaintiff; court's refusal to do so is denial of full
and complete exercise of judicial discretion.
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28
U.S.C.A.
7. Federal Civil Procedure <S=>1700
When considering motion to voluntarily
dismiss case after defendant has filed answer, court must remember that the important factors in determining legal prejudice
are those involving parties, not court's time
or effort spent on case. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
8. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700
Court abuses its discretion when it denies motion to voluntarily dismiss case after
defendant has filed answer based on its own
inconvenience.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
9. Federal Civil Procedure <3=*1700
District court abused its discretion when
it denied mother's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague Convention petition for return of
child to Sweden solely on grounds of her
contempt of its order not to remove child,
and without considering any additional circumstances, including merits of motion. International Child Abduction Remedies Act,
§ 4, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
10. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1693
Whether motion to voluntarily dismiss
case after defendant has filed answer may be
granted is matter initially left to district

court's discretion, but such discretion does
not excuse court's failure to exercise any
discretion, nor does it save unpermitted exercise of discretion from reversal. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
11. Federal Courts <3=>812
Court abuses its discretion when it fails
to consider applicable legal standard or facts
upon which exercise of its discretionary judgment is based.
12. Federal Courts <3=>937.1
Although district court's failure to apply
correct legal standard when it denied mother's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague
Convention petition for return of child to
Sweden could serve as basis for remand,
Court of Appeals would determine merits of
mother's motion, as no dispute regarding
underlying facts existed and record was adequate to address issues of concern. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
13. Federal Civil Procedure <&=>1700
Mother should have been allowed to voluntarily dismiss her Hague Convention petition for return of child to Sweden, after
mother had taken child to Sweden and father
had filed his own Hague Convention petition,
in Sweden, for return of child to United
States, as father would not suffer legal prejudice from dismissal, claims and defenses of
both mother and father could be more fairly
adjudicated in Sweden, and failure to grant
motion to dismiss could create new incentive
for parents to flee Hague Convention proceedings in hope of obtaining second, more
favorable Convention determination in another country. International Child Abduction
Remedies Act, § 4, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603;
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28
U.S.C.A.
14. Federal Civil Procedure ®=>1701.1
For purposes of determining whether
mother was entitled to voluntarily dismiss
her Hague Convention petition for return rf
child to SwTeden, there was no improper ddlay or lack of diligence on mother's part
sufficient to legally prejudice father. Inter*
national Child Abduction Remedies Act, | %'
42 U.S.C.A. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.Pro&
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
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15. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700
Fot purposes of determining whether
mother was entitled to voluntarily dismiss
her Hague Convention petition for return of
child to Sweden, reasons mother gave for
granting motion to dismiss, including contention that petition was moot because child was
no longer in United States, that Hague Convention allowed for dismissal of proceedings
trader such circumstances, and that father
had initiated duplicative action in Sweden,
were not insufficient such that* they preju-^
diced father. International Child AbductionRemedies Act, § 4, 42 U.S.CJL • § 11603;
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28
U.S.CJL
16. Federal Civil Procedure <®=»780
Hague Convention petition father filed
in Sweden for return of his child to United
States would not be construed as counterclaim to mother's prior Hague Convention
petition, filed in United States, for return of
phild to Sweden, as father's claims were asserted in court of another jurisdiction. International Child Abduction Remedies Act,
§V42*U.S.C.A. § H603; Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc^ule 8(c), 28 U.S.CA.
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International Child Abduction Remedies Act,
§ 4(b, e), 42 U.S.CA. § 11603(b, e).
19. Contempt <3=>70
Court's interest in ensuring party's com^
pliance with its orders is great one, enforce-1
able by fines or imprisonment.
20. Contempt <S=>70
When imposing civil contempt sanctions,
court is obliged to use least possible power
adequate to end proposed.
21. Parent and Chjld <®=>18
Treaties <®=»13
District court should not have denied
mother's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague
Convention petition for return of child to4
Sweden, as civil contempt sanction for mother's conduct in taking child back to Sweden
in violation of court order, as other measures
were available to compel compliance with
order, such as personal sanctions against'
mother, or possibly staying decision pending
child's return. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, §§ 4, 5, 42 U.S.CA
§§ 11603,11604.

17. Federal Civil Procedure ®=»1700
In determining whether to grant mother's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague
Convention petition for return of child to
Sweden, which motion was based, in part, on
father's subsequent Hague Convention petition filed in Sweden, district court should
have considered importance of proper, urnform interpretation of Hague Conventipp,
along with Convention's purpose. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, § 4, 42
U.S.C.A. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C A

Gary L. Paxtpn (Rodney G. Snow with Jiim
on the briefs) of Clyde, Snow & SwensQn,
P.C., Salt J.ake City, UT, for Respon4§ntrAppellee.

18. Parent and Child <S=*18
Treaties @=>13
Under contemplated procedures of
Hague Convention, district court, in ruling on
mother's Hague Convention petition for return of child to Sweden, should not have
considered mother's removal of child from
United States to Sweden m violation of court
order, as father had not filed cross-petition
to adjudicate propriety of mother's removal.

Ms. Ohlander appeals the United States
District Court for the District of Utah's judgment denying her petition for the return of
her daughter Julia to Sweden under the
Hague Convention, ordering Julia's return to
Utah, denying her two motions to withdraw
and dismiss her petition, denying her motions to stay enforcement of the judgment,
and a subsequent judgment denying her Fed.
R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to set aside the judg-

Darnel F. Bertch (Billie C. Nielsen, with
him on the brief), of Bertch & Birch, Salt
Lake City, UT, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Before BRORBY, BARRETT ancj
MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
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ment.1 Applying the standards under Fed.
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) in the Hague Convention
context, we determine the district court
abused its discretion in denying the motion
to dismiss. We reverse and remand to the
district court with instructions to dismiss Ms.
Ohlander's petition.

I. BACKGROUND
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the
"Convention"), as implemented by both the
United States Congress through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994), and Sweden,
was adopted by the signatory nations "to
protect children internationally from the
harmful effects of their wrongful removal or
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their
habitual residence." Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Dec. 23, 1981, Preamble, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10494,10,498 (1986). The Convention is
meant to provide for a child's prompt return
once it has been established the child has
been "wrongfully removed" to or retained in
any affiliated state. Id,, art. 1, 51 Fed.Reg.
at 10498.
Under the Convention, a removal or retention is "wrongful" if:
a. it is in breach of rights of custody
attributed to a person, an institution or
any other body, either jointly or alone,
under the law of the State in which the
child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention; and
b. at the time of removal or retention
those rights were actually exercised, either
jointly or alone, or would have been so
exercised but for removal or retention.
Id, art. 3, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10498. Once a
removal is deemed "wrongful," "the authority
concerned shall order the return of the
child." Id., art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499.
However, the Convention provides for several exceptions to return if the person opposing
return can show any of the following: 1) the
1. Ms Ohlander's appeal of the district court's
denial of her motion to set aside the judgment
under Fed R Civ P 60(b) was consolidated with
the direct appeal

person requesting return was not, at the time
of the retention or removal, actually exercising custody rights or had consented to or
subsequently acquiesced in the removal or
retention, id., art. 13a, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499,
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 2) the return of
the child would result in grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child, id.,\
art. 13b, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 3) the
return of the child "would not be permitted >
by the fundamental principles of the request-,
ed State relating to the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms," id., art.,
20, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10500, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(A); or 4) the proceeding was
commenced more than one year after the'
abduction and the child has become settled in
the new environment, id., art. 12, 51 Fed.4
Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B).
II. FACTS
Ms. Ohlander, a Swedish citizen, and Mr.
Larson, a United States citizen, were married in Utah in 1989. In August 1990, their
daughter Julia was born in Provo, Utah.
During the Christmas holiday season of
1990-91, when Julia was five months old, the
entire family traveled to Sweden to visit Ms.
Ohlander's family with the intent to return to*
their Utah home in January 1991. After
arriving in Sweden, Ms. Ohlander decided to
remain in Sweden with Julia; Ms. Ohlander
went into hiding with her daughter and severed contact with her husband. Mr. Larson (
returned to Utah alone in mid-January 1991.
By April 1991, Mr. Larson had reestab-'
lished contact with Ms. Ohlander. In June
1991, with Julia now almost a year old, Ms.'
Ohlander returned to Utah to be with Mr.?
Larson. Ms. Ohlander and Julia remained
with Mr. Larson for seven months. On Jani-*
uary 13, 1992, Ms. Ohlander returned withj
Julia to Sweden without Mr. Larson's consent.
By November 1993,2 Julia had resided con*|
tinuously in Sweden for almost two years, l
and was a little over three years old. Mr.)
2.

Between January 1992 and November 1993.
Ms Ohlander and Mr Larson were participating'
in divorce and custody proceedings taking placi)
in Sweden.
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Larson returned to Sweden with his new wife
to see Julia, and during one visitation, applied the law of "grab and run" taking Julia
back to Utah without Ms. Ohlander's consent. In January 1994, Ms. Ohlander filed a
petition seeking her daughter's return pursuant to the Hague Convention in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah.
Ms. Ohlander also secured an ex parte Order
for Issuance of Warrant in Lieu of Writ of
Habeas Corpus from the district court, directing peace officers to take Julia into protective custody and to release her to Ms.
Ohlander, but prohibiting Ms. Ohlander from
removing Julia from Utah pending further
order. Mr. Larson delivered Julia to Ms.
Ohlander on January 30, 1994, and on February 1, 1994, Ms. Ohlander disobeyed the
court's order and applied her own version of
the law of "grab and run" by returning to
Sweden with Julia.
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Ms. Ohlander had '"wrongfully removed" her
from Utah.5
The United States district court conducted
a hearing on Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss. During that hearing, the United
States district court was informed of Mr.
Larson's Hague Convention proceeding in
Sweden. The district court denied the motion to dismiss solely on the basis of Ms.
Ohlander's contempt of its order not to remove Julia from Utah. Ms. Ohlander later
orally renewed her motion to dismiss, which
the district court denied on the same
grounds.

The district court conducted a bench trial
on Ms. Ohlander's Hague Convention petition
to determine the issues of habitual residence
and wrongful removal pursuant to the Convention. However, neither Ms. Ohlander nor
Julia was present for the hearing, nor did
they testify by other means. Ms. Ohlander
In August 1994, shortly after Julia's fourth
presented no live witnesses and relied only
birthday, the district court entered an order
on the stipulated facts set out in the Pretrial
finding Ms. Ohlander in contempt and directOrder. Ultimately, the district court found
ing her to return Julia to the United States
Julia was at all times a "habitual resident" of
within thirty days. Ms. Ohlander failed to
Utah, and as such, Ms. Ohlander's retention
comply. Two months later, in October 1994,
of Julia in Sweden in 1991, and her removals
following Ms. Ohlander's and Julia's return
to Sweden, Mr. Larson filed a Convention of Julia from Utah in 1992 and 1994 were all
application for Julia's return with the United '"wrongful" under the Convention. AccordStates Central Authority, which was forward- ingly, the district court ordered Julia's immeed to Sweden's Central Authority.3 Ms. Ohl- diate return to Utah and requested the aid of
ander then filed a motion, pursuant to Fed. the Contracting States in achieving that goal.
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2), to dismiss her district court
Following the United States district court's
petition, based, in part, on the Convention's decision, the Sweden courts held hearings to
art. 12, which authorizes a judicial authority determine the merits of Mr. Larson's petito stay or dismiss the application or judicial tion. Both Mr. Larson and Ms. Ohlander
proceedings seeking a child's return.4 were present during the Sweden court proHague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at ceeding. The Sweden Supreme Administra10499. In January 1995, prior to the hearing tive Court held Julia's habitual residence
on Ms. Ohlander's motion, Mr. Larson peti- changed from Utah to Sweden after she had
tioned the Sweden court pursuant to the lived in Sweden for twelve months following
Convention for Julia's return on the ground the January 1992 abduction—a decision di3. 42 U.S.C. § 11602 distinguishes between applications and petitions filed under the Convention.
A petition exists upon a person filing for relief in
court, while an application exists upon a person
filing with the United States' or any other country's Central Authority for a child's return. 42
U.S.C. § 11602(1), (4).
4. Specifically, the Convention's art. 12 states:
Where the judicial or administrative authority
in the requested State has reason to believe

that the child has been taken to another state,
it may stay the proceedings, or dismiss the
application for the return of the child.
Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499.
5.

Presumably, Mr. Larson filed the petition in
addition to the application to prevent Ms. Ohlander from asserting the "settled environment" defense as it pertained to Ms. Ohlander's 1994
removal. This defense is discussed infra at p.
1540.
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rectly in conflict with the United States district court's holding.
Once the Sweden court had made its ruling, Ms. Ohlander filed a motion to stay
enforcement of the United States district
court's order, and a motion to set aside the
United States' judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b). The United States district court denied the motions, again solely on the basis of
Ms. Ohlander's contempt. We are presented, therefore, with two international decisions standing in direct conflict, and it is this
contradiction we attempt to resolve for both
the present case and for future cases.
III. DISCUSSION
This case presents issues novel to this
court, and according to our research, novel to
this country. Our aim is to provide courts
with guidance in future similar cases, namely,
where two civil actions under the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abductions are filed in disparate
courts due to a child's removal from the court
of first jurisdiction. Also, our aim is to give
meaning to the Convention's intended purpose of discouraging parents from fleeing
with their children in search of a favorable
decision. Notably, we are faced not only
with issues of the proper interpretation of
bare text in the form of the Hague Convention treaty, but also with the plight of a now
six-year-old girl to whom the law of "grab
and run" repeatedly has been applied.
We therefore must examine the following
competing interests of: the district court ensuring compliance with its orders; the procedural conduct of the parties; and most important, the Convention's intent and our duty
to see that intent justly carried out. Against
this backdrop, we attempt to untangle the
Gordian knot the parents, together, have
seen fit to tie.
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS
Even though Ms. Ohlander appeals several
of the district court's rulings, our decision on
the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) is dispositive. Thus, we
need not address the remaining issues. We
therefore turn our focus to whether the district court abused its discretion in denying

Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2).
A. Relevant Facts
Ms. Ohlander's first motion to dismiss was
filed shortly after Mr. Larson filed his Hague
application for Julia's return to Utah with the
United States Central Authority. Ms. Ohlander's counsel raised her second motion to
dismiss orally during the bench trial. Relying on the Convention's art. 12, Ms. Ohlander
argued in her first motion to dismiss that
because Julia was no longer in the United
States and because Mr. Larson had initiated
his own Hague Convention application, the
United States district court should dismiss
the petition for Julia's return to Sweden. By
the time the United States district court
heard arguments regarding the first motion
to dismiss, Mr. Larson had initiated his own
petition in the Sweden courts regarding the
wrongfulness of Julia's removal from the
United States. The district court was aware
of the duplicative judicial action in Sweden.
Notwithstanding its knowledge of Mr. Larson's Hague Convention proceedings in Sweden, the district court summarily denied Ms.
Ohlander's motion solely on the basis of Ms.
Ohlander's contempt stating:
I'm not going to grant the Motion to
Dismiss and I'm not going to grant it
simply because this woman, the petitioner,
in my opinion, isn't in a position to ask me
to do that, because she's in violation of the
orders of this Court. She is simply in
violation. She invoked the jurisdiction.
She asked for our help, and then she,
contrary to the order of the Court, ran.
In her second motion to dismiss, Ms. Ohlander relied again on the Convention's art. 12,
the fact that Julia was no longer in the
United States, and the fact that Mr. Larson
had initiated judicial proceedings in Sweden.
The district court again denied Ms. Ohlander's second motion to dismiss due to her
contumacious conduct.
B. Relevant Factors Considered Under
41(a)(2)IStandard of Review
[1-4] Once a defendant files an answer,,
as was the case here, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action only upon order of
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the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). We review
the district court's decision to deny a voluntary dismissal under such conditions for
abuse of discretion. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Bic Corp., 931 F.2d 1411, 1412
(10th Cir.1991). Absent "legal prejudice" to
the defendant, the district court normally
should grant such a dismissal. See Andes v.
Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir.
1986) (voluntary dismissal "should not be denied absent substantial prejudice to the defendant"); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781
F.2d 855, 856-57 (11th Cir.1986) ("in most
cases a dismissal should be granted unless
the defendant will suffer clear legal prejudice"). The parameters of what constitutes
"legal prejudice" are not entirely clear, but
relevant factors the district court should consider include: the opposing party's effort and
expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the
movant; insufficient explanation of the need
for a dismissal; and the present stage of
litigation. Phillips U.S.A, Inc. v. Allflex
U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir.1996).
Each factor need not be resolved in favor of
the moving party for dismissal to be appropriate, nor need each factor be resolved in
favor of the opposing party for denial of the
motion to be proper. Id. at 358.
The above list of factors is by no means
exclusive. Id. at 358. Any other relevant
factors should come into the district court's
equation. In fact, in the context of this
Hague Convention proceeding, the district
court was impressed with a duty to exercise
its discretion by carefully appraising any additional factors unique to the context of this
case, including the interests in comity, uniform interpretation of the Convention and
the importance of giving import to the Hague
Convention's intended purpose as relevant to
the motion to dismiss.
[5,6] The district court should endeavor
to insure substantial justice is accorded to
both parties. 9 Charles Alan Wright and
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2364 at 278 (2d ed. 1994). A court,
therefore, must consider the equities not only
facing the defendant, but also those facing
the plaintiff; a court's refusal to do so is a
denial of a full and complete exercise of
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judicial discretion, Id. at 297. In a complex,
emotional case such as this, it is critically
important when considering a motion to dismiss, the court give the equities of the plaintiff the attention deserved.
[7,8] Finally, when considering a motion
to dismiss, a court must remember the important factors in determining legal prejudice
are those involving the parties, not the
court's time or effort spent on the case.
Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th
Cir. 1993). A court abuses its discretion
when denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 41(a)(2) based on its inconvenience. Id.
at 1411.
[9-11] In sum, the district court was obligated to consider the novelty of the circumstances surrounding this case. Instead, the
court did not consider the merits of Ms.
Ohlander's motion due exclusively to her contumacious conduct. It is true Ms. Ohlander
blatantly violated the court's orders and absconded to Sweden with Julia in tow. We
refuse to condone such conduct. However,
neither can we condone a court ignoring its
duty to consider the merits of a motion to
dismiss simply because a party has violated
its orders. Whether a motion to dismiss
under Rule 41(a)(2) may be granted is a
matter initially left to the district court's
discretion, but such discretion does not excuse a court's failure to exercise any discretion, nor does it save an unpermitted exercise
of discretion from reversal. Alamance Indus., Inc. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 146-47
(1st Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 831, 82 S.Ct.
53, 7 L.Ed.2d 33 (1961). A clear example of
an abuse of discretion exists where the trial
court fails to consider the applicable legal
standard or the facts upon which the exercise
of its discretionary judgment is based. See
McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 888
F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (reviewing a
district court's 60(a) motion under an abuse
of discretion standard). We believe the district court's decision to deny Ms. Ohlander's
motion solely on the grounds of her contempt
and without considering any additional circumstances, amounts to a failure to exercise
discretion, and is, consequently, an abuse of
that discretion.
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C. Merits of Ms. Ohlander's 41(a)(2)
Motion
1. Traditional Factors
[12] Although the district court's failure
to apply the correct legal standard could
serve as a basis for remand, in the interest of
efficiency and judicial economy, and in the
interest of providing immediate guidance as
to the most appropriate direction of this case
in light of the Convention's purpose, we turn
to the merits of Ms. Ohlander's motion to
dismiss. Clark, 13 F.3d at 1411-13 (considering on appeal the merits of motion to dismiss after district court abused its discretion); Park County Resource Council v.
United States Dept of Agric, 817 F.2d 609,
617-18 (10th Cir.1987) ("Although failure to
apply correct legal standard could be basis
for remand to the district court, we have
found that remand is not necessary where
there is no dispute regarding the underlying
facts and where it is in the interest of judicial
economy and efficiency to decide the matter."); see also McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d
606, 613 (D.C.Cir.1980) (although inadequate
findings and conclusions may be remanded to
the district court for supplementation, appellate court will not remand for more specific
findings if doing so will consume judicial
resources without serving any purpose). We
believe, as is obvious from our remaining
analysis, no dispute regarding the underlying
facts exists and the existing record is adequate to address the issues of concern.
[13,14] Mr. Larson argues that to grant
Ms. Ohlander's motion would subject him to
legal prejudice. More specifically, Mr. Lar6. The dissent opines our statement here "is a
conclusory statement lacking support in the record" because between the time Ms. Ohlander
initiated the Convention proceeding and filed her
motion to dismiss, Ms. Ohlander "did virtually
nothing to affirmatively move her case along."
Unfortunately, this court has yet to explicitly
define "diligence" in the context of a Rule
41(a)(2) motion to dismiss. While the dissent
purports an "affirmative act" requirement, the
cases from this circuit touching on the issue
characterize diligence quite differently. Allflex,
11 F.3d at 358 (movant's request for additional
time to respond to proffered facts and to conduct
further discovery constituted lack of diligence);
Clark, 13 F.3d at 1412 (movant's failure to exhaust state claims for purposes of habeas review
"cannot be construed as lack of diligence"); see

son argues he would be unfairly prejudiced
by Ms. Ohlander's excessive delay and lack of
diligence, and by the lack of a sufficient
explanation in favor of dismissal. See Allflex, 77 F.3d at 358. Mr. Larson argues Ms.
Ohlander's filing of her motion to dismiss
eleven months after the initiation of the pro^
ceedings and after Mr. Larson had requested
a final pretrial hearing constitutes delay and
lack of diligence. However, while Ms. Ohlander moved to dismiss her petition eleven
months after she initiated the proceeding,
our examination of the record illustrates Ms.
Ohlander filed her motion to dismiss only
after Mr. Larson had filed his application for
Julia's return with the United States Central
Authority. Therefore, the most persuasive
reason to file a motion to dismiss did not
arise until eleven months following the initial
proceeding's initiation. As a result, the timing of Ms. Ohlander's motion could not constitute excessive delay sufficient to legally
prejudice Mr. Larson. Moreover, the record
shows Ms. Ohlander's counsel was actively
and diligently moving forward with the case
regardless of Ms. Ohlander's absence.
Counsel was present at and participated in
every hearing.6 Therefore, we conclude
there was no improper delay or lack of diligence on Ms. Ohlander's part sufficient to
legally prejudice Mr. Larson.
[15] Further, we believe the reasons Ms.
Ohlander has given for granting the motion
to dismiss are not insufficient such that they
prejudice Mr. Larson. In her motions to
dismiss, Ms. Ohlander argued her petition
was moot and because Julia was no longer in
also, United States v. Outboard Marine Corp, 7891
F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir.1986) (lack of diligence •
may be shown by evidence of bad faith or unwar-,
ranted delay). We are not certain what "affirmative acts" the dissent would require, and to the
extent it would require a movant to file additional motions prior to a motion to dismiss, all in the
name of "affirmative acts," we disagree. In fact,
affirmative acts to prolong litigation more typi-u
cally provide a basis for finding excessive delay;
and lack of diligence. See, e.g., Allflex, 11 F.3d at
358. The record before us shows counsel was
present at and fully participated in all hearings
and, outside the motions to dismiss, which were'
timely filed, did not cause undue delay. Conse-;
quently, there is adequate support in the record
to reach our conclusion.
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Utah, the Convention's art. 12 allowed for a
stay or dismissal of the proceedings. Ms.
Ohlander also relied on the fact Mr. Larson
himself initiated a duplicative action in Sweden as further support for the imposition of
the Convention's art. 12 dismissal provision.
Certainly, the first two reasons alone are
insufficient to support a motion to dismiss
and could give parents an undue incentive to
flee from Hague Convention proceedings.
However, as discussed at length below, we
place greater weight on Ms. Ohlander's proffered reasons that Mr. Larson initiated a
second action in Sweden and that the Convention's art. 12 lends support for dismissing
the United States proceeding. Ms. Ohlander's reasons for requesting the motion to
dismiss are not insufficient such that they
legally prejudice Mr. Larson. Rather, as
Ms. Ohlander emphasizes, by initiating a judicial proceeding in Sweden Mr. Larson himself, along with the Convention's terms, provided the most persuasive reason to dismiss
the United States district court proceeding.
Mr. Larson is hard pressed to argue he is
prejudiced by his own actions.
[16] Mr. Larson also argues the motion
to dismiss should not be granted because his
response to Ms. Ohlander's Hague Convention petition should be construed as a counterclaim. It is true a court may construe a
pleading mistakenly designated as a defense
as a counterclaim when justice requires.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). However, because Mr.
Larson filed his own Hague Convention petition in Sweden, we remain unconvinced jus7. The dissent claims that by relying on the fact
Mr. Larson initiated the second proceeding in
Sweden we are somehow "punishing" Mr. Larson for enlisting the aid of the Sweden courts.
On the contrary, we are only holding Mr. Larson
accountable for his actions. Even though Julia
was no longer within the United States when Mr.
Larson filed the petition in Sweden, the United
States court retained jurisdiction to determine
Julia's state of habitual residence. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(b). The United States district court had
jurisdiction over the original petition as the court
"in the place where the child is located at the
time the petition is filed." Therefore, even
though Julia was removed, the United States
Court retained jurisdiction to determine the
child's place of habitual residence. Additionally,
the permissive language of the Convention's art.
12 dismissal provision, which allows a court to
stay or dismiss an action versus mandating a
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tice requires us to construe Mr. Larson's
response to Ms. Ohlander's petition as a
counterclaim in this case. Mr. Larson chose
to assert his claims in a court of another
jurisdiction. Justice does not require us to
tortuously construe his response to Ms. Ohlander's petition simply to retain jurisdiction
over this matter. Had Mr. Larson wanted
the United States courts to adjudicate his
claim Ms. Ohlander wrongfully removed Julia
from Utah, he would have been far better
served by filing a cross-petition with the
district court rather than initiating an entirely new proceeding in Sweden. Consequently,
we refuse to construe Mr. Larson's response
as a counterclaim.7
2. Additional Relevant Factors
[17] As already noted, given the unique
circumstances of this case, the district court
should have considered the importance of a
proper, uniform interpretation of the Convention, along with a consideration of the
Convention's purpose, when evaluating the
merits of Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss.
We now consider those factors.
a. Proper Interpretation of the Hague
Convention's Procedures
When the district court considered whether Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia from
Utah was wrongful, it misconstrued the Convention's contemplated procedures. According to the Convention, once a petition is filed,
a court should consider only whether a redismissal once a child is removed, suggests the
United States court retained jurisdiction even
after Julia was removed from Utah.
,
Rather than relying on the original action, Mr.
Larson initiated a second proceeding, which has
resulted in a ruling contrary to his interests and
which has resulted in two conflicting international decisions, a problem we must somehow address. Certainly, we are not punishing him by
subjecting him to the results of the proceeding
he, in fact, initiated. Further, the fact Mr. Larson attempted to limit the Sweden court's jurisdiction is of no moment. Once Mr. Larson filed
the petition in the Sweden court, that court had
proper jurisdiction to determine Julia's place of
habitual residence regardless of the fact Mr. Larson attempted to limit the Sweden court's review
to the 1994 removal. Hague Convention, art. 3,
51 Fed.Reg. at 10498.
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spondevt's removals of a child are wrongful.
See Hague Convention, arts. 3, 12, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10498, 10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b),
(e). Here, antithetic to the Convention's intent as a whole, the court considered whether
the petitioner's removals of the child were
wrongful.
[18] When Ms. Ohlander petitioned the
United States district court for Julia's return
to Sweden, the issue before the court was
whether Mr. Larson's removal of Julia from
Sweden was wrongful pursuant to the Convention. Hague Convention, art. 3, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10498. Once Ms. Ohlander removed
Julia from Utah, the issue became whether
Ms. Ohlander's removals were wrongful. 7c?.
By filing his own petition in the Sweden
courts, Mr. Larson chose to adjudicate Ms.
Ohlander's removals of Julia in the foreign
court rather than in the United States district court. The district court's consideration
of Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia without
Mr. Larson having filed a cross-petition in
that court was contrary to the Convention's
intended procedures.

10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). Consequently, Ms. Ohlander could not, under the
Convention's contemplated procedures, properly assert the "settled environment" defense. However, once Mr. Larson filed his
own petition in Sweden seeking to adjudicate
Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia from Utah,
Ms. Ohlander rightfully could assert the "settled environment" defense. Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). Conversely, had Mr. Larson filed a cross-petition in the United States
district court for Julia's return to Utah, rather than instigating an entirely new action in
Sweden, Ms. Ohlander properly could have
asserted her defenses in the United States
district court. Since Mr. Larson chose to
initiate a second Convention proceeding in
Sweden, Sweden was the jurisdiction where
the claims and defenses of both Ms. Ohlander
and Mr. Larson could be more fairly adjudicated. Therefore, the proper interpretation
of the Convention weighs in favor of dismissing the United States action and allowing the
issues to be decided in Sweden.8

Additionally, denial of Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss renders Ms. Ohlander's most
relevant defense to Julia's return to Utah
unavailable, namely, the "settled environment" defense. Hague Convention, art. 12,
51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). Under the Convention's
plain terms, one defense to a child's return is
showing the petition was filed a year after
the child's removal or retention and that the
child has become settled in his or her new
environment. Hague Convention, art. 12, 51
Fed.Reg.
at
10499,
42
U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). When Ms. Ohlander filed
her petition, she was asking for Julia's return
to Sweden; any defenses to Julia's return,
under Article 12 or otherwise, were available
only to the respondent, Mr. Larson. See
Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at

This result is further supported by the
plain language of the Convention's art. 12,
which states "where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has
reason to believe the child has been taken to
another State, it may stay the proceedings or
dismiss the application for the return of the
child." Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10499. While this language is permissive rather than mandatory, its words
merit a court's consideration when denying a
motion to dismiss. Congress has declared
the importance of "the need for uniform international interpretation of the Convention."
42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B). Article 12 helps
to ensure two disparate courts will not reach
conflicting decisions by encouraging courts to
dismiss or stay their actions where appropriate. This case poses a perfect example of
the need for Article 12's dismissal provision:

8. The dissent takes issue with our interpretation
of the availability of this defense to Ms. Ohlander. Apparently, the dissent interprets the Convention as restricting the Sweden court's review
to Ms. Ohlander's 1994 removal of Julia and not
to allow review of Ms. Ohlander's additional
retentions and removals of Julia, particularly Ms.
Ohlander's 1992 removal of Julia from Utah. We
disagree with this inteipretation. The Conven-

tion is intended to provide finality to the parties,
and it is our duty to see this intent carried out.
We note this is an extremely difficult case, dealing with the Convention's interpretation, an area
singularly lacking in helpful precedent or congressional guidance. It is merely our duty to
resolve this case as best we can in accordance
with our interpretation of the Convention and to
give import to the intentions of that Convention.

OHLANDER v. LARSON
Cite as 114 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1997)

the United States district court had knowledge that Julia had been taken to Sweden,
$jid that a second action initiated by Mr.
Larson was pending in Sweden, where all the
parties, including the child, were present.
Therefore, we conclude the adherence to intended Hague Convention procedures support Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss.
b. Intent of the Hague Convention
Failing to grant the motion to dismiss
where a second duplicative action has been
filed in a different country would potentially
render the Hague Convention meaningless.
Part of the Convention's intent is "to ensure
that rights of custody and of access under
the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in other Contracting States."
Hague Convention, art. 1(b), 51 Fed.Reg. at
10498. Prior to the Convention, when faced
with an unfavorable custody decision, a parent would flee to another country in search of
a custody decision in his or her favor. This
would often result in two conflicting custody
decisions without guidance as to which country's custody decision had preference. The
Hague Convention was drafted with the intent to remove forever the incentive for a
parent to flee across borders to obtain a
favorable ruling. Letter of Transmittal from
President Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985),
reprinted in 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10,495
(1986); Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. 10494,
10505 (1986). Under the Convention, a child
is to be expediently returned to his or her
state of habitual residence "so that a court
there can examine the merits of the custody
dispute and award custody in the child's best
interests." Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. at
10505. As a result, the Convention was
meant, in part, to lend priority to the custody
determination hailing from the child's state
of habitual residence.
While the Convention proceedings in this
case certainly have not achieved this intended result, a refusal to dismiss this action only
exacerbates the problem. By failing to dismiss the United States action we would allow
to stand two conflicting decisions regarding
9. The dissent opines our reliance on this factor is
ironic because the conflict between the two decisions was merely "potential" at the time Mr.
Larson filed the duplicative action in Sweden. It
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Julia's state of habitual residence, which
could very well require a Hague Convention
to determine which Hague Convention determination is valid. This, of course, is absurd.
By dismissing this action, we instead require
these and future litigants to choose which
jurisdiction will determine a child's state of
habitual residence, thereby salvaging what
we can of the Convention's intended purpose.9
Failing to grant the motion to dismiss also
could create a new incentive for parents to
flee Hague Convention proceedings in the
hope of obtaining a second, more favorable
Convention determination in another country. We then would be left to solve the
riddle of which competing ruling in each case
is valid. This is a task we refuse to acquire.
Rather, we believe the parties' interests
would be best represented and judicial resources best spent if parents engaged in this
type international custody battle are required to resolve their dispute in one jurisdiction or the other. Holding Mr. Larson
and future litigants to one jurisdiction gives
import to the Convention's intended meaning.
c. Ms. Ohlander's Contempt
[19-21] Certainly, the court's interest in
ensuring a party's compliance with its orders
is a great one, enforceable by fines or imprisonment. Spallane v, United States, 493 U.S.
265, 276, 110 S.Ct. 625, 632-33, 107 L.Ed.2d
644 (1990). However, a court is obliged to
use the "ieast possible power adequate to
the end proposed.'" Id. at 276, 110 3.Ct. at
632 (quoting United States v. Yonkers, 856
F.2d 444, 454 (2d Cir.1988), and Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)).
Here, certainly other measures were available to compel compliance, such as personal
sanctions against the mother, or possibly
staying a decision pending the child's return.
Under the provisions of the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act, the district
court has the authority to implement meais precisely the "potential" conflict between different countries' custody decisions that made the
Convention necessary.
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sures to "prevent the child's further removal
or concealment before the final disposition of
the petition." 42 U.S.C. § 11604. Given Ms.
Ohlander's history of removing Julia from
the United States, to prevent Ms. Ohlander
from repeating this -behavior, perhaps the
district court should have imposed more rigid
measures, such as requiring Ms. Ohlander to
surrender both her and Julia's passports to
the clerk of court prior to receiving physical
custody of Julia, or leaving custody with Mr.
Larson pending the petition's outcome. See
Currier v. Currier, 845 F.Supp. 916, 923
(D.N.H.1994) (district court requiring petitioner surrender her and her children's passport to the court's clerk pending appeal).
However, if such measures are not imposed,
or if they fail, the court is not thereby released of its duty to consider the merits of
the parties' cases when considering how best
to enforce compliance. In sum, there is no
doubt Ms. Ohlander's actions were contemptible, for she brazenly thumbed her nose at
the United States district court's order not to
remove Julia from Utah; nevertheless, such
conduct does not warrant a court denying a
motion to dismiss solely on that ground.
In sum, we hold it necessary to dismiss
this action. Mr. Larson does not suffer legal
prejudice from such a dismissal, and the
balance of relevant factors, along with the
intent of the Convention, weigh in favor of
dismissal.
, We REVERSE the district court and REMAND with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I concur in the majority's conclusion that
the district court erred in failing to consider
the governing legal standards and relevant
facts relating to Ms. Ohlander's Fed.R.Civ.P.
41 motion to dismiss. Rather than resolve
the Rule 41 issue ourselves, however, we
should remand this case to the district court
for an appropriate Rule 41 evaluation and an
accompanying adequate development of the
1. As discussed on pages 1534-35, the only other
factor the majority articulates in favor of Ms.
Ohlander's motion is its conclusory statement,
lacking support in the record, that there was no
excessive delay and lack of diligence on Ms.

record in light of the new law established bf\
this court's opinion. Therefore, I dissent
from the majority's resolution of the motiotf
to dismiss on the merits and its failure'tcf
remand.
' ;r< ^
A.

Rule 41(a)(2) Factors

'• hoo

The trial court denied Ms. Ohlander's f$A
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss for the
sole reason that Ms. Ohlander was hi contempt of court. In doing so, the court faim
to consider the appropriate legal standard
under Rule 41(a)(2). Although the trial wujjj
could properly consider Ms. Ohlander's cqij(j
temptuous conduct, it was also required ^
evaluate other governing legal criteria
McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cos. Co.,- 88R
F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (noting trififc
court errs when it fails to consider applicable
legal standard or facts on which exercise toft
discretionary judgment is based). Its fafltire*
to do so requires reversal.
' Wtfflfl;
Ironically, the majority has reversed .thjjf
district court for refusing to grant Ms.<;Q)d|
ander's motion for the sole reason that fenk
was in contempt of court, yet ruled & 'nogjf
that Ms. Ohlander's motion should be gnitiitg
ed for the sole reason that Mr. Larson
ated his own Hague Convention proi
ings.1 The district court was required^
evaluate fairly all Rule 41 factors; we shi
similarly be bound. An adequate rec6r<r<
remand, however, would be necessary,
In evaluating a Rule 41(a)(2) motion]^
dismiss, a court must consider the preju
to the non-moving party. Clark v. Tan
F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir.1993). In fM
we adopted the following factors to"&8
"legal prejudice" to the opposing partyi^]
the non-moving party's effort and expenii$j
preparation for trial; (2) the moving pa
delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting!
action; and (3) insufficient explanatidii^
the need to allow a dismissal. Clark, 13'H
i'ffcli"
Ohlander's part in bringing her motioi
Stripped of this unsupported assertion, it i
dent that the majority's outcome rests on
the desire to avoid a potentially conflicting'!
sion from another sovereign state.
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at 1411. This list is not exhaustive; a court
may also consider other relevant factors in
its Rule 41(a)(2) analysis. Phillips USA
Inc. v. Allflex USA Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358
(10th Cir.1996) (noting above factors are not
exclusive, but instead are guides for district
court).
The record does not address Mr. Larson's
effort and expense of preparation for trial.
Ms. Ohlander did not file her motion to dismiss, however, until Mr. Larson had filed a
request for a final pretrial conference, suggesting that Mr. Larson had completed substantial trial preparation. If so, this would
weigh against granting a motion to dismiss.
As to the second Tansy factor, the majority states that "the record shows Ms. Ohlander's counsel was actively and diligently moving forward with the case regardless of Ms.
Ohlander's absence." Maj. Op. at 1538. A
review of the docket sheet, the only record of
Ms. Ohlander's litigation activity, undermines
this assertion. The docket reveals that Ms.
Ohlander waited almost a year after initiating her action before filing her motion to
dismiss. During this time she did virtually
nothing to affirmatively move her case along;
instead, she merely responded through counsel to Mr. Larson's efforts to obtain a contempt order and the return of Julia to Utah.
Thus, if anything, the limited record before
us supports the conclusion that Ms. Ohlander
did not diligently prosecute this action. Indeed, her conduct in absconding with Julia in
violation of the court order belies a motivation to move her case forward. A remand
would be useful on this point to explore
whether she or her counsel made any efforts
to prosecute the case that do not now appear
in the record.
The majority also opines that because Ms.
Ohlander filed her motion to dismiss after
Mr. Larson filed his application with the
United States Central Authority, "the timing
rf Ms. Ohlander's motion could not constitute
I. As noted on pages 1535-36, his filing in Sweden was also mandated by the United States
enabling legislation for the Hague Convention,
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excessive delay sufficient to legally prejudice
Mr. Larson." Maj. Op. at 1538. The logic of
this statement is unclear. The filing of her
motion in no way reflects her pre-filing diligence in prosecuting her case once she removed the child from the United States in
violation of the district court's order. Indeed, Mr. Larson's application with the United States Central Authority is absolutely irrelevant to an evaluation of whether Ms.
Ohlander diligently pursued her separately
filed action before the United States District
Court.
Finally, Ms. Ohlander did not provide a
sufficient explanation of her need for dismissal. Ms. Ohlander gave three reasons for her
Rule 41 motion, all derived from her fleeing
with the child in violation of the district
court's order and her defiance of the district
court's subsequent order that the child be
returned to Utah. None of Ms. Ohlander's
reasons warrant dismissal of her action. The
majority forthrightly acknowledges that
granting Ms. Ohlander's motion based on her
first two reasons (that her petition was moot,
and the child was no longer in the state of
Utah) would create a perverse incentive for
others to use United States courts to obtain
physical control of their children and then
unlawfully flee the United States. Thus,
these reasons concededly provide no support
for Ms. Ohlander's motion.
The majority concludes that Ms. Ohlander's third reason for dismissal, Mr. Larson's
application to the Swedish Authority and his
subsequent petition to the Swedish court,
"provided the most persuasive reason to dismiss the United States district court proceeding." Maj. Op. at 1539. Punishing Mr.
Larson for enlisting the aid of the only sovereignty with physical control of his child, however; ignores the practical and emotional dilemma with which Mr. Larson was faced.
Litigating this matter in the United States
could not provide Mr. Larson what he sought
most: contact with his child. With his child
in Sweden, albeit unlawfully, Mr. Larson had
no real alternative but to seek Swedish assistance.2 Otherwise, he was faced with the
devastating potential of a lingering loss of
contact with his daughter. In addition, Mr.
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act,
which provides jurisdiction only to courts "in the
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Larson had strategic litigation reasons for
filing in Sweden when he did. The Hague
Convention allows a parent who has fled even
unlawfully with a child to assert a settled
environment defense to a petition for return
of a child if the petition is not filed within one
year from the date the child is taken. Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Dec. 23, 1981, art. 12,
51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10499 (1986). Mr. Larson, therefore, had only one year to file if he
wanted to prevent Ms. Ohlander from creating this defense by her unlawful flight. Under these circumstances, Mr. Larson's filing
in Sweden does not in any way compel the
dismissal of the United States action.
B. Additional Factors
1. Appropriate Forum
The majority maintains that Sweden was
"the jurisdiction where the claims and defenses of both Ms. Ohlander and Mr. Larson
could be more fairly adjudicated." Maj. Op.
at 1540. Specifically, the majority bases its
preference for a Swedish adjudication on the
presence of all the parties, including Julia, in
Sweden, and its view that only in Sweden
could Ms. Ohlander assert a "settled environment" defense.
Placing weight on the presence of all parties in the Swedish proceedings is inappropriate. The precipitating reason for all parties'
participation in the Swedish action was Ms.
Ohlander's unlawful flight from the United
States with Julia. Had Ms. Ohlander obeyed
the district court's order and remained in
Utah with Julia during the pendency of the
United States proceedings, all parties would
have been physically present for the United
States proceedings. Instead, Ms. Ohlander
chose to participate through counsel rather
than to personally attend the United States
trial. Her unlawful absence from the United
States trial should not accrue to her benefit.
The majority's view that the settled environment defense is available only in Sweden
is similarly flawed. Article 12 of the Hague
Convention creates the settled environment
place where the child is located at the time the

defense only when "a period of less than one
year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention." Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499. Because
Mr. Larson filed in Sweden within one year
of Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia, the defense was unavailable to Ms. Ohlander in the
Swedish action. Similarly, if Mr. Larson had
complied with the majority's ruling and filed
in the United States within one year of Julia's removal, the defense would have been
unavailable in the United States action.
Furthermore, the majority erroneously asserts that denying Ms. Ohlander's motion to
dismiss renders the settled environment defense unavailable to her in the Utah action.
The availability of the settled environment
defense hinges on the filing and timing of
Mr. Larson's own petition, not on whether
Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss is granted
or denied.
2. Hague Convention Procedures
The majority also states that Mr. Larson
"chose to assert his claims in a court of
another jurisdiction," Maj. Op. at 1539 (emphasis added), and that he would have been
better served by filing a cross-petition in the
United States District Court. Mr. Larson
did not, however, have a choice where to file
his petition once Ms. Ohlander took Julia to
Sweden. Section 11603(b) of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, the
enabling legislation for the Hague Convention, provides:
Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access to a child may do so
by commencing a civil action by filing a
petition for the relief sought in any court
which has jurisdiction of such action and
which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located
at the time the petition is filed.
42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (emphasis added). At
the time Mr. Larson filed his petition in
January 1995, Julia was in Sweden, not Utah.
At that point in time, the enabling legislation
petition is filed." 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b).
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for the Hague Convention itself compelled
Mr. Larson to file in Sweden because of
Julia's presence there; it was the only nation
with jurisdiction.
Mr. Larson was careful to limit his Swedish petition to the issue of Ms. Ohlander's
taking of Julia in February 1994. The petition specifically informed the Swedish court
of the Hague Convention proceedings pending in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, and that Mr. Larson
was not intending to confer jurisdiction on
the Swedish courts over the Hague Convention matters that were properly before the
United States District Court. Mr. Larson
also requested that the Swedish courts await
the district court's ruling on those matters.
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ed to nor acquiesced in the removal.
These findings, coupled with the judicially
established fact that the child was habitually resident in Utah in November 1993,
where she continued to live until the date
of said removal, clearly establish that this
was a new wrongful removal within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
Memorandum from Mr. James L. Schuler,
Office of Children's Issues, United States
Central Authority, to Central Authority of
Sweden 2 (August 14,1995).
The Hague Convention procedures thus
not only required Mr. Larson to file in Sweden, where the child was located, but also
allowed him to limit his petition to the one
issue not before the United States District
Court. By following Hague Convention procedures and limiting his Swedish petition, he
did not voluntarily create the potential for
conflicting international decisions.

After the United States District Court entered its findings and conclusions, the United
States Central Authority notified Sweden of
the United States ruling and asked that the
Swedish court limit its decision to the issue
3. Conflicting Decisions
presented in Mr. Larson's petition. In a
The majority's desire to avoid conflicting
memo to Sweden's Central Authority, a repdecisions of sovereign states is a worthy goal.
resentative of the Office of Children's Issues
Nevertheless, no law, national or internationstated:
al, can be expected to resolve such conflicts
The only unresolved Hague Convention isin all cases, particularly cases involving a
sue for the Swedish courts to rule upon is mother and father warring over their offthe final resolution of Ms. Ohlander's most spring. To base the outcome of this case on
recent removal of the child from Utah on a potentially conflicting decision of Sweden is
February 1, 1994. There is no doubt that to unjustifiably abandon the rights of a UnitSweden is the "requested State" for the ed States citizen in the name of international
adjudication of that issue, and that the comity. It is indeed ironic to do §o when the
Swedish courts have exclusive jurisdiction substantive decision of the district court was
to make a final resolution of that matter in not in conflict with any extant Swedish deciaccordance with the provisions of the sion at the time of its promulgation. To the
Hague Convention. Regarding that re- contrary, the Swedish decision favorable to
moval, the U.S. Court, as a judicial author- Ms. Ohlander created the conflict in the deciity of the "requesting State," has made sions of two sovereign nations. The Swedish
findings in accordance with Article 15 of decision was issued after and in conflict with
the Convention, namely that the removal the district court decision.3 See United
was in breach of Mr. Larson's actually- States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165,
exercised rights of custody under Utah 169-70 (3d Cir.1997) ("As a condition to honlaw, and that Mr. Larson neither consent- oring a foreign country's judicial decrees, the
3. Before the Sweden Supreme Administrative
Court created the international conflict in decisions, the United States Central Authority entreated the Swedish courts:
It is only through [ ] cooperation that the
Hague Convention can successfully resolve
these international conflicts over children, as it
was designed to do. The present case offers a
perfect illustration: A Hague Convention judgment from Sweden which respects the prior

Hague Convention judgment from the U.S. will
put an end to the international jurisdictional
competition between these States and will allow for a final and long-overdue custody adjudication, thus providing for the best interests
of the child and finally allowing her to develop
stable, secure family relationships, On the
other hand, a Hague Convention judgment
from Sweden which disregards the prior
Hague Convention judgment from the United
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Court also requires reciprocity on the part of
the foreign nation."); Remington Rand
Corp.-DeL v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d
1260, 1273 (3d Cir.1987) (noting comity must
be "two-way street" anil reciprocity is consideration of "extreme importance").
Because no Hague Convention decisions
had been rendered by any Swedish courts at
the time the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss, it is furthermore inappropriate for this court to base its ruling on the
conflict in decisions. See Maj. Op. at 1541
("By failing to dismiss, the United States
action we would allow to stand two conflicting decisions regarding Julia's state of habitual residence
"). Instead, our review
should be limited to those factors before the
district court at the time it ruled. New
factual matters should only be considered by
the district court in the exercise of its discretion on remand.
4. Consideration of Ms. Ohlahder's Contempt
The district court's consideration of Ms.
Ohlander's contempt of court was entirely
appropriate. Although the district court considered this to the exclusion of other relevant
criteria, its actions in doing so are understandable, if not correct. Ms. Ohlander
availed herself of the services of the district
court to obtain temporary custody of the
child.' She then fled this country in direct
States would only perpetuate and escalate the
already intolerable conflict, as the parties
would then possess contradictory Hague Convention judgments in their favor from their
respective States, which would be the most
unstable and insecure situation imaginable.
Such a situation would guarantee that whichever parent has possession of the child would
not dare allow the other parent access to the
child, and the parent without possession of the
child would have no option but to resort to
force in order to have dny contact with the
child.
Memo from Mr. James L Schuler, Office of
Children's Issues, to Central Authority of Sweden
'2-3 (August 14, 1995).
4.

Rule 41(a)(2) provides: "If a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon the defendant of the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim
can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court." Fed.RXiv P. 41(a)(2).

violation of the very order by which she
obtained physical control of the child. Her
conduct can neither be ignored nor rewarded. Although this should not control the
district court's decision to the exclusion of
other governing factors, it may fairly be given significant weight in the court's overall
analysis.
C. Treatment of Larson's Defenses as
Counterclaims
The majority rejects Mr. Larson's request
that his response to Ms. Ohlander's petition
be treated as a counterclaim or, for Hague
Convention purposes, a petition.4 Maj. Op.
at 1538-39. Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure allows a court to treat a
defense as a counterclaim, "if justice so requires." In Mr. Larson's response to Ms
Ohlander's petition, he alleges that the United States was, and at all times had been, the
country of Julia's habitual residence as defined under the Hague Convention, and
prays for his daughter's return to his physical care and control. The essence of Mr.
Larson's response is generally equivalent to
the relief he would request were he to file his
own formal Hague Convention petition.5
Treating Mr. Larson's response as a counterclaim would place the respondent's removal
of the child and any proper settled environment defense before the district court, thus
eradicating the majority's concern that such
issues could not be decided without Mr. Lar5.

For example, Ms Ohlander's petition before
the district court requested the following relief:
Petitioner requests that the child be immediately returned to her custody, and that she be
permitted to return to Sweden, which is the
country of habitual residence of both Petitioner
and the child, and that temporarily, pending
further hearing on this Petition, she be permitted to retain custody of the child within the
jurisdiction of this Court pending this Court's
final determination
Petition for Return of Child to Petitioner at 4:
Mr. Larson alleged substantially the same matters in his defenses. Justice would not be served
by requiring Mr Larson to file a separate pleading, formally designated as a counterclaim, alleging the very matters already contained in his
defenses. To do so honors form over substance
in an emotionally charged setting where a parent
seeks to reestablish contact with his child.
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son's own petition in the district court. See
Hague Convention, arts. 3 & 12, 51 Fed.Reg.
at 10,498-10,499; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), (e).
In light of Rule 41(a)(2) factors and the
Hague Convention's objective of protecting
children from the law of "grab and run,"
(Maj. Op. at 1534-35), the interests of justice
are indeed served by construing Mr. Larson's response as a counterclaim.
D. Conclusion
The majority has reversed the district
court for refusing to dismiss Ms. Ohlander's
petition on the basis of her contempt of court
and instead has ruled de novo that Ms. Ohlander's motion should have been granted.
In doing so, the majority has considered
facts not before the district court at the time
it ruled. It has further allowed those very
facts (ie.f conflicting international decisions)
to control the outcome of this appeal, to the
exclusion of other governing criteria.

has set forth a set of novel factors it believes
must be evaluated in this case. The trial
court had absolutely no notice that consideration of such factors would be required in
this case. If the majority is going to require
a trial court to consider novel factors, that
court should be given an opportunity to exercise its discretion, address those factors on
remand and develop a meaningful record.
At that time, the district court cpuld carefully
consider the mandate of the Convention's
Article 12 which provides that a forum may
stay or dismiss a Hague Convention proceeding when the subject child has been taken to another State. Hague Convention, art.
12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,499.
In the context of this case, an appellate
ruling as a matter of law is inappropriate. I
would reverse and remand for further proceedings on Ms. Ohlander's Rule 41 motion
to dismiss.
O f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

This case should be remanded to the district court for full consideration of Rule
41(a)(2) criteria.6 The trial court failed to
consider critical factors governing Ms. Ohlan- EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, Eastman
der's motion. Consequently, the record of
Chemical Company, and Zimmer Aksuch factors is incomplete. An appellate
tiengesellschaft, Plaintiffs/Cross-Appelcourt may decide a matter rather than relants,
mand if the underlying facts are undisputed
v.
and judicial economy and efficiency would be
The GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER
furthered thereby. Park County Resource
COMPANY, DefendantCouncil, Inc. v. United States Dept ofAgric,
Appellant,
817 F.2d 609, 617-18 (10th Cir.1987), overand
ruled on other grounds by Village of Los
Shell
Oil
Company,
Defendant-Appellant.
Ranches de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d
Nos. 95-1511, 95-1512, 95970, 973 (10th Cir.1992). Such is not the
case here. A remand is required when the
1532 and 95-1533.
record needs further development. See
United States Court of Appeals,
Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 341 (10th
Federal Circuit.
Cir.1994) (remanding when record inadeMay 20, 1997.
quate to evaluate trial court's consideration
of required criteria).
As Modified on Limited Grant of
Rehearing July 2, 1997.
In this case, the record is simply insufficient to enable this court to apply adequately
the legal criteria governing Rule 41(a)(2) moOwner of exclusive right to enforce pattions to dismiss. In addition, the majority ent for process for making granules of con6. It is incongruous for this court to say that Rule
41 motions are addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court and yet, rather than remand,
rule de novo that trial court discretion as a matter of law could only result in dismissal. Beyond
this incongruity, ruling de novo that Ms. Ohlander's Rule 41 motion should be granted as a

matter of law assumes that the district court's
discretionary ruling upon remand would be denial of the motion, rather than granting the motion
or even staying the action, an alternative expressly contemplated by the Hague Convention.
Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,499.

